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第一期

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Diversifying Korea-Gulf Relations: From Construction to Halal Industries

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I. Introduction

South Korea and the Gulf have enjoyed a cooperative economic relationship during the last 40 years. Recently South Korea has been shifting its focus in the Gulf from economy-oriented cooperation to more strategic areas like the nuclear energy sector, political and strategic partnership, and military cooperation.¹ It can be said that a turning point was the year 2009 when South Korea and the UAE signed a number of cooperation agreements related to the construction of nuclear power plants. Especially important was the \$20-billion contract between

¹ For one perspective on the development of South Korea's involvement in the Gulf, see Joachim Kolb, "Small is Beautiful: South Korean-Gulf Relations as an Example of Strategic Engagement by Players in Different Areas", in in *Asia-Gulf Economic Relations in the 21st Century: the Local to Global Transformation*, ed. Tim Niblock, with Monica Malik (Berlin, Gerlach Press, 2013), 289-319.

the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation and a consortium of South Korean companies (led by the Korea Electric Power Corporation- KEPCO) to design, **build**, help operate and maintain four civil nuclear power plants as part of the UAE's peaceful nuclear energy program.

The nuclear deal was expanded to the dispatch of South Korean military personnel, the 'Akh Unit' to the UAE. This was a military training unit which started deploying in January 2011 on a two-year mission to train special Emirati warfare troops. This constituted a dramatic development in South Korea's cooperation with the Gulf countries. Never before had it dispatched troops abroad, except under the umbrella of a multinational force or in peacekeeping operations. This military cooperation, moreover, has facilitated other forms of strategic cooperation between South Korea and the Gulf. In recent years, South Korea and some of the Gulf countries have been in active discussion over ways to foster bilateral military exchanges and strategic cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia has now established a military attaché office at the Saudi Embassy in Seoul, which is the country's first in the Far East.

In the 20th century there were no obvious security dimensions to the increasingly interdependent relationship between South Korea and the Gulf. However, the Gulf countries have started to find alternative or at least supplementary security partners in this century. This is because, as James Onley argues, the 21st century has

witnessed the straining of relations between the Arab world and the West, due especially to the events of 11 September 2001, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.² **This has meant that the dependence of the Gulf countries on a Western security umbrella has become somewhat problematic.** Some GCC countries have, therefore, begun seeking positive alternatives to dependence on the West. This has started to open the doors for Asian countries like South Korea to seek a more active role in the security and defense arena with its primary energy suppliers.

The strategic relationship between South Korea and the Gulf region has steadily improved and expanded since 2009. The relationship, moreover, is likely to evolve further as part of the new political order and economic situation of the 21st century, when the GCC countries are likely to balance their relations with Western and East Asian powers. It is particularly noteworthy that South Korea has been more assertive and active than the Gulf countries in strengthening the security cooperation and broadening its focus in the region from purely economic considerations to one where there is wider strategic and military cooperation. This is because South Korea has been obliged to diversify its business in the Gulf area in the 21st century when the domestic economy has been transformed from labor-intensive construction and manufacturing to sophisticated

² James Onley, *The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

technology-based and more value-added industries, when other developing countries like China have started to challenge the dominant position of Korean companies in the Middle East construction market. In this regard, this paper begins with a brief historical background of strategic relations between the Gulf and South Korea to understand how Korea's interest and focus in the Gulf area have evolved. On the basis of historical understanding, this study has placed emphasis on the recent security and military cooperation.

II. The Era of Military Cooperation

There has not been any substantial security collaboration between Korea and the Gulf countries. However, the various tensions and conflicts in the region, such as the 9.11 attacks in 2001 and the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq have to a degree shaken the security reliance of the Gulf countries on the Western countries. Some Gulf governments and political elites have begun to envisage a possible supplementary or alternative to dependence on Western countries. In this context, Korea has sought to pursue a positive role in the security sector.

These changing attitudes can be found in the remarks of government officials. For example, President Lee did not forget to mention possible military cooperation when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2012. In a meeting on 8 February with Sheikh Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Saudi Minister of Defence, President Lee discussed ways

to strengthen military cooperation. The President also emphasised this field of cooperation when he met King Abdullah. This initiative of the President encouraged government institutions and business circles in South Korea to accelerate their activities in the defence sector. The head of the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA), which oversees the defence industry and defence exports, visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel in May 2012 to build up cooperation with Middle Eastern countries. With the encouragement of the DAPA, many Korean defence industry companies participated in various defence-related exhibitions in the Middle East such as the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) and the International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) in Abu Dhabi. Eighteen Korean companies took part in the First International Defence, Security and Aviation Exhibition in Baghdad in April 2012, and 7 companies in the Special Operations Forces Exhibition and Conference (SOFEX) in Jordan in May 2012.

South Korea's military and defense-related commercial activities in the Middle East have been affected by three factors relating to South Korean politics in the 21st century. These factors are: involuntary military involvement and later, voluntary cooperation, anti-piracy military operations, and concern about the Iran-North Korea nuclear connection. These issues have changed Seoul's overall perception of the Gulf region and contributed to reformulation of its Middle East strategic and economic policies.

The new millennium presented another change in South Korea–Middle East relations. For the first time, Seoul became militarily involved in the region. In the first Gulf War in 1991, Washington pressured Seoul to send forces to participate in the war. Seoul was not inclined to send forces to Iraq but did eventually agree to send forces to battle-zone locations.³ Seoul's eventual participation was limited to 314 people who worked in medical and transportation support. Historically, South Korea had not taken a meaningful part in a war outside its borders before, except in the Vietnam War, which President Park Chung-Hee was eager to participate in due to the Cold War dimension. He saw the participation of the Korean forces as part of the war against communism, a means to sustain the alliance with Washington. He was also interested in the foreign income which would accrue to South Korea from the US, in return for the supply of 300,000 soldiers. The 1991 Gulf War occurred after the Cold War ended, so Seoul was not as enthusiastic about taking sides in this. Seoul did not perceive the Gulf War as a war that it should fight, as it had in Vietnam, and the financial need for economic assistance did not exist as it had during the Vietnam War.

South Korea's second participatory role in a military operation in the region was assumed under heavy pressure from Washington to send forces to Iraq in 2003. Again, there was a severe controversy on the issue. Seoul

³ Alon Levkowitz, "The Republic of Korea and the Middle East: Economics, Diplomacy, and Security." *Academic Paper Series of Korea Economic Institute* 5 (6) (August 2010), p. 4.

wanted to be perceived in a positive manner by the Arab world and wished to prevent potentially negative effects on its trade in the region. But Washington was no longer willing to accept South Korea's limited involvement in Iraq as it had in the previous war. In 2004 Seoul decided to dispatch 3,500 South Korean soldiers to Iraq. Although the South Korean forces were not in a battle zone, they were nonetheless present in Iraq while the low-intensity conflict continued. The South Korean forces participated in civilian projects in Iraq even though Washington would have preferred that they participate in the military tasks. This indicated a change in South Korea's level of involvement in the region. Military forces as well as commercial and construction companies, were now present in the region.

South Korea's decision to send forces to southern Lebanon as part of the UN peacekeeping forces after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict stands as another example of Seoul's new policy towards the Middle East. The decision to send forces to Lebanon was based on the assumption that none of the sides to the conflict suspected Seoul of having a hidden political or ideological agenda. Seoul was therefore a perfect candidate for participating in a peace force in the Middle East. Through this military engagement, Korea intends to strengthen its military relationship with the Gulf and other Arab countries. The best example of this has been the dispatch of the Akh Unit to the UAE. The Akh Unit started its deployment in January 2011 on a two-year mission to train the UAE special warfare troops. This constituted a turning point in Korean military cooperation with the Gulf countries; South Korea has never dispatched

troops abroad without the umbrella of a multinational force or of peacekeeping operations. The new type of military cooperation has, moreover, resulted in some further forms of cooperation between the two countries. In 2011, Korea's chairman of its Joint Chiefs of Staff visited the UAE and met top military commanders of the country in order to discuss ways to foster bilateral military exchanges and cooperation in the defense industry. It was the first official visit of Korea's JCS chief to the country. This change in Seoul's policy coincides with incremental change in South Korea's broader foreign policy in the new millennium, as it has moved from being a passive global player to a more active player, not just on the Korean peninsula but also in international organizations and other regions as well.

III. The Turning Point: Nuclear Cooperation

The second wave of South Korea's economic cooperation with the Gulf countries is characterized by technological and multi-dimensional strategic involvement. In this regard, the deal with the UAE on nuclear development constituted a crucial turning point in Gulf-South Korea relations. With South Korea winning a deal to build a gigantic nuclear power plant in the United Arab Emirates, South Korea has become the world's sixth largest nuclear power plant exporter following the Big 5 (US, Japan, France, Russian, and Canada).⁴ A nuclear power plant has a unique characteristic of generating high added value and huge industrial linkage effects as it is built under a

⁴ Mohammed Turki Al-Sudairi, "South Korea-GCC Economic Relations: An Overview," *GRC Gulf Papers* (November 2012), p. 7.

comprehensive export package of design, construction, and maintenance.⁵

The UAE selected in 2009 a consortium led by KEPCO, a South Korean government-owned electric utility, for the contract to design and construct four Advanced Power Reactors (APR-1400s) in Barakah. In addition to the nuclear deal, the two countries also agreed to cooperate on renewable energy, education, shipbuilding, information communications technology and human resource development, as well as the strategic storage of six million barrels of Abu Dhabi oil in Korea.⁶ As part of the military cooperation, the South Korean military committed to provide two years of special forces training to its UAE counterparts. The two countries also agreed to hold joint military exercises and exchange defense industry technology and high-ranking military officials.⁷ This kind of regular-base exchange of human resources had been rare in Gulf-South Korean relations before the nuclear deal. According to the *WAM*, one of the main criteria in awarding the contract to the South Korean consortium was Korea's "commitment and detailed planning for human resource development in the UAE in support of the

⁵ Ki-Chan Park and Françoise Chevalier, "The Winning Strategy of the Late-Comer: How Korea Was Awarded the UAE Nuclear Power Contract," *International Review of Business Research Papers*, Vol. 6, No. 2, July 2010, p. 225 and 234.

⁶ *Yonhap News* (29 December 2009).

⁷ Michel Berthelemy and Francois Leveque, "Korea nuclear exports: Why did the Koreans win the UAE tender?" April 2010, *CERNA Working paper* 2011-04, http://hal-ensmp.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/58/53/16/PDF/Korea_CernaWP_version.pdf.

development of a sustainable, domestically-sourced nuclear energy workforce that is dominated by competent national talent.”⁸

In spite of the fact that the contract has a very small profit margin,⁹ it is important to note that winning the UAE nuclear deal helped South Korea to become a major exporter of nuclear plants.¹⁰ In March 2010, Jordan signed a \$130 million agreement with South Korea to supply Jordan’s first nuclear research reactor. The Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Daewoo are constructing the reactor at the Jordan University of Science and Technology (JUST). The reactor is expected to be operational by 2015. The South Korean also plans to establish a nuclear training centre at JUST where Jordanian nuclear engineers and technicians would be trained by South Korean experts.

Another positive result of the nuclear deal can be found in the overall increase of trade and energy-security

⁸ “UAE Selects Korea Electric Power Corp. Team as Prime Contractor for Peaceful Nuclear Power Programme,” *WAM Emirates News Agency*, December 27, 2009,

http://www.wam.org.ae/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1261832658351&pagename=WAM%2FWAM_E_PrintVersion.

⁹ In fact, the low price was criticised by some members of the opposition party within South Korea. Lee Tae-hoon, “Senior DP official says President lied about UAE nuclear deal,” *Korea Times* (16 February 2011).

¹⁰ The Korean government announced in 2010 that it would seek to export 80 nuclear reactors by 2030. “South Korea Seeks to Boost Reactor Exports,” *World Nuclear News* (13 January 2010).

cooperation. Trade between the two countries grew 24 percent to \$22 billion in 2011, with UAE exports to Korea rising by 21.2 percent in 2011 and Korean exports to the UAE growing by 32.4 percent.¹¹ Another benefit South Korea secured as a result of the nuclear deal was a more stable supply of oil and gas. Both countries agreed to store six million barrels of oil from Abu Dhabi in Korea and to enable Korea to use it in emergency situations. South Korea was also able to increase significantly the ratio of its oil and gas imports secured through oil development and production by Korean firms.

In order to understand the trickle-down effects of the nuclear deal on military cooperation between Korea and the Gulf countries, news coverage on this issue was quantitatively analysed. First, the amount of newspaper articles on Gulf-Korean military cooperation was compared 3 years before and after the nuclear deal in December 2009.¹² According to the results shown in Table 2, the number of newspaper articles on the issue almost doubled from 45 articles in the period between December 2006 and November 2009 to 86 in the period between December 2009 and November 2012. It can be said that the increase of newspaper article numbers reflects the

¹¹ "South Korea and UAE: Beautiful Cooperation," *CNN*, June 22, 2012, <http://business.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/22/south-korea-and-uae-beautiful-cooperation/>.

¹² The newspaper articles were collected from the five major newspapers: *Chosun Daily*, *Joongang Daily*, *Donga Daily*, *Munhwa Daily*, and *Hangyeore Daily*.

more assertive or positive activities in the field of military cooperation between the two regions.

Table 1. Number of Newspaper Articles on Gulf-Korean Military Cooperation

Period	3 Years before Dec. 2009	3 Years after Dec. 2009
Number of Articles	45	86

Second, 86 articles were categorized into 3 areas of cooperation: visits by military officials, defense industry cooperation, and military and security operation. Before the nuclear deal, the cooperation was focused on official visits by military officials, such as Defense Ministers, Chiefs of Staff, and other educational exchanges of military personnel, occupying 51% of all activities. Defense industry related activities and cooperation followed the official visits. The newspaper articles on military and security operation made up only 13% of the total articles. This was an indication that direct military operations between Korea and the Gulf region were not frequent except for the anti-piracy naval operations in the Gulf of Aden.

Table 2. Areas of Gulf-Korea Military Cooperation in the Newspaper Articles

Areas of Cooperation	3 Years before Dec. 2009	%	3 Years after Dec. 2009	%
Official Visits of military officials	23	51	30	35
Defence industry cooperation	16	36	38	44
Military and security operation	6	13	18	21
Total	45	100	86	100

In comparison with the period before the nuclear deal, the 3 years following the deal witnessed a dramatic increase in defense industry cooperation and the number of articles related to this area reached 38 out of 86 (44%). Transactions and contracts regarding the exports of weapons and other military equipment and supplies attracted attention from the media and the public. Furthermore, according to the news coverage, both official visits and military operations between Korea and the Gulf region also increased after the nuclear deal with the UAE.

IV. A New Initiative: Halal Industries

As Korean businesses increase exports to the Middle East and other countries with Muslim populations, Korea has been recently eager to expand its Halal industries. In 2014,

Korea exported a wide range of halal-certified food products worth \$680 million. It plans to increase the amount to \$1.23 billion by 2017 as the global halal food market will expand to \$1.6 trillion.

The demand for halal food is also on the rise in the domestic market on the back of the increasing number of students and travelers from Muslim countries. In March, Hanyang University in Seoul opened the country's first halal food cafeteria on campus. "We have 80 Muslim students and the number increases every year. The cafeteria will help their settlement in Korea," a spokesman for the university said. Sunmoon University in Asan, South Chungcheong Province, followed suit early last month by opening a halal food cafeteria for its Muslim students. The influx of travelers from Muslim countries is also on the rise as a result of hallyu. Nearly 300,000 Muslim people visited the country last year with nearly half coming from Indonesia, according to the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO).

To advance into one of the biggest food markets in the world, the Korean government took the first step of MOU between Korea and the United Arab Emirates. During the Korea-United Arab Emirates business forum in Abu Dhabi on March 5 after signing the MOU, President Park Geun-hye said that, "Korea and Abu Dhabi are tied together in a strategic partnership that will last for a century," suggesting that the two nations should work together to enhance cooperation on energy and on higher value-

added businesses, and should join forces to make inroads into third markets. Regarding cooperation on value-added industries, President Park mentioned halal food. She said, "There is huge potential for bilateral cooperation in the food industry, especially on halal food. The two nations will be able to take the lead in the global food industry if they use a reliable halal certification system, develop mutual trust and create menu items favored in both countries." She also mentioned that the two nations maintain bilateral ties in the public health sector. She expressed her hope that they expand such cooperation to cover medicine, too, giving a chance to boost investment and cooperation between private companies

South Korea has launched a new halal food agency in a bid to expand its food exports to the Middle East and Muslim countries. The agency focuses on analyzing halal food standards in diverse Muslim countries to provide the nation's food manufacturers with guidelines for halal-certified production and development. The Agriculture Ministry hopes the MOU and the newly-established Halal food agency could help domestic food exporters make easier inroads into the global food market.

The halal industry was somewhat limited ten years ago. But since 2010 Korean companies has been highly interested in expanding Halal industries. Dozens of Korean companies have got Halal certifications from Islamic countries. Food giants such as CJ, Nongshim and Pulmuone rushed to get their export products packaged

with what they now call the "must-have" mark. Domestic food giant CJ CheilJedang recently earned halal certification for 30 food products, including steamed rice, dried seaweed and kimchi, from the Malaysian government. CJ plans to increase its annual sales to 100 billion won by 2018. The firm is developing new products suitable for Muslim customers in Europe and the United States. In 2010, another processed food giant Daesang earned halal certification for its dried seaweed and mayonnaise, from Indonesian authorities. The certification led to a seven-fold sales increase of mayonnaise and four-fold of dried seaweed in the period between 2012 and 2013. Korea's largest bakery chain Paris Baguette earned halal certification from the Korea Muslim Federation (KMF) in December 2012. The KMF's certificate is acceptable only in Korea, but the firm believed that recognition would make it easier for the company to win halal status in major Muslim countries. SPC, which owns Paris Baguette, is making headway to its ambitious goal of becoming the world's largest bakery company by 2020. Its globalization strategy includes some Muslim countries in the Middle East. Other food makers that earned halal certification from more than one Muslim state are Namyang Dairy Products, Orion and Lotte Confectionary.

The government has rolled up its sleeves to help companies win the certification. In March 2013, the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy signed a memorandum of understanding with Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Indonesia's top Muslim clerical body and halal

certification issuer, to make it easier for domestic food makers to enter the Indonesian market. Investment-Trade Promotion Agency has also launched halal culture education sessions for small and midsize Korean food companies

V. Conclusion

On 27 June 2012, the Middle East and North Africa Centre at the Asian Institute for Policy Studies at Seoul hosted a roundtable meeting examining the causes, characteristics, and potential consequences of the rapidly growing economic ties between South Korea and the Middle East. The roundtable discussion, entitled “the ‘Second Middle East Boom’ and the Search for South Korea’s Middle East Strategy,” invited leading Korean experts from government, the construction industry, the oil corporation, and the research and academic community to share their views and insights on the major trends and developments shaping Korea’s economic relationship with the Middle East. One of the most important recommendations for the Korean government raised by participants related to public diplomacy, which was seen as having a positive influence on Arab public opinion towards South Korea. The participants emphasized the importance of developing simultaneously both the ‘hardware’ of a strong construction and investment regime and the ‘software’ of deep bonds through promoting inter-cultural exchanges. They also agreed that fostering greater public awareness and interest in both Korea and the Gulf must be an

essential component in strengthening the current positive relationship.

South Korea and member states of the Gulf countries have reaffirmed their close ties and have exchanged views on ways to look beyond the traditional energy supplier-and-consumer relationship. Both sides are focusing on how Korea and the Gulf government can enhance their ties to a strategic partnership, especially in view of what is happening in the wider Arab world. Many government officials and experts from Korea and the Gulf states have emphasised that they must look beyond the traditional form of cooperation and expand joint efforts in regional security, renewable energy and development.

As examined above, the relationship between Korea and the Gulf region has continued to be strengthened and broadened for the past several decades. This relationship has also evolved in the new millennium, in light of the expectations that are likely to balance their existing relationships with the Western powers and East Asia.¹³ It will be enhanced by improving non-economic ties, including in the military field.¹⁴ South Korea has gradually shifted its interests in the Gulf from the pure economic cooperation to more strategic areas, such as the nuclear

¹³ Moran, D. and Russell, J. (eds.) *Energy Security and Global Politics: The Militarisation of Resource Management* (London: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁴ Davidson, Christopher M. *The Persian Gulf and Pacific Asia: From Indifference to Interdependence*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.

energy sector and military cooperation, ultimately leading to comprehensive strategic partnership-building.

The intensifying mutual engagement between South Korea and the Gulf countries will include more diverse areas and sectors. Military cooperation is expected to be expanded and strengthened while allowing the United States to continue in its role as the protector of the Gulf States.¹⁵ These diverse linkages between Korea and the Gulf countries will accompany a fresh wave of opportunities for Korean and Gulf governments and companies to work together. This cooperative mechanism will grow even tighter in the near future.

¹⁵ Palmer, Michael A. *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

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The New Silk Road and Intercommunication between Peoples

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1- The Old Silk Road and New Silk Road:

The term “Silk Road” is used in two senses – literal and metaphorical. When talking about it in its original sense economic historians tell us that the Arab world was a centre of global trade that straddled three continents and that Arab traders trafficked in goods that they bought and sold as they travelled overland and across the seas between Asia, Africa and Europe. Later, however, the centre of global commerce shifted gradually westwards, driven by the disasters and calamities that afflicted the Arab world, and consequently the silk caravans linking Asia with Europe all but disappeared, striking the death knell for a highly significant era in the history of world trade.

Much later, however, the fortunes of the world trade began to revive, particularly starting from the Far East to the

Arabian/Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. International banks opened branches over the old routes while business zones and cargo ports have been established in place of the caravans of former times. Just as was the case with the area in general, this was accompanied by a strong economic revival throughout. This explains why some economists today are talking about “a revival of the Silk Road” – in its literal rather than metaphorical sense. Today the economic focus on the Silk Road has never been stronger.

However, the new Silk Road also has a cultural side and this is reflected in numerous ways. TV satellite channels are springing up and a communications revolution is taking place, along the new Silk Road. In 1991, H.M Sultan Qaboos sponsored the UNESCO journey for re-exploring the Silk Road between Venice to Osaka. Later he then sponsored the UNESCO website of the Silk Road website (named 'The Silk Road online Platform for Dialogue, Diversity & Development'). Certainly this type of involvement encourages co-operation and understanding between the different religions and nations along the route.¹

2 – Towards a new mutual understanding between religions and cultures

¹ <http://en.unesco.org/silkroad/>

We live in an age of multi-culturalism, ethnic pluralism and globalisation and this raises the question of how we should communicate and interact with others, or what we might call the “different other”.

Intercommunication along the new Silk Road involves mutual contacts among followers of the great religions of Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. Today we shall re-evaluate the recent view which presupposes a clash of civilizations and the inevitability of conflict between religions. Instead we will pick up on the often marginalised conversation where people are talking of a religion, ethics or values “encounter”, and the “shared” or “common” Silk Road. Indeed, with a history of mutual contacts going back over a thousand years all sides can benefit from “mutual understanding” among a diverse plurality of religion and cultures. Certainly we should mull over the issues and seek new insights through encountering together both our shared and our separate heritages.

When we in the Arab world hear the expression “interfaith dialogue” we immediately think of it as being a dialogue between the Abrahamic faiths, either between Islam and Christianity or Islam and Judaism. In both these cases the primary reference would be dialogue between the Muslim East and the Judaeo-Christian West.

However, the idea of a West-East or East-East Silk Road dialogue rarely enters our minds, despite the fact that West-East Christian-Buddhist or Hinduism dialogues have been going on for some time and is seen by both sides as moving in a positive direction. Meanwhile, dialogue

between Islam and the Eastern religions is still in its early stages.²

In this context we are reminded of the initiative by Catholic philosopher Hans Kung entitled "Global Ethics", which was globally welcomed. Certainly, it is an important initiative post-Cold War instead of clashes among civilizations". Kung's initiative has brought recognition to role of religious ethics whether Abrahamic or non-Abrahamic in order to confront global developments in the 21 century.³

Similarly, in Oman we also have an Arabic-Islamic initiative by Shaykh Abdullah b. Muhammad al-Salmi, the Minister of Endowments and Religious Affairs. This initiative is based on the recognition of values among religions and humanities by reason, ethics and justice. This gives a different approach than those mainly used among Abrahamic religions.⁴

In the old days the relationships between different faiths was defined by rivalry, conquest and military campaigns, and it was sometimes in this context that mutual antipathy developed among the religions. Today, however, in the age of the communications revolution, that kind of attitude is unproductive. Where religions are concerned, the communications revolution has now opened a door that

² Johan Elverskog, *Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2010, p.53.

³ Hans Kung, *A Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

⁴ Abdullah Bin Mohammed Al Salmi, *Religious Tolerance: A Vision for a new World*, ed. Angliki Ziaka, Olms Verlag, 2016.

had long been closed; and while that door used to be opened by force and coercion on those rare occasions when it was opened in the past, today all religions can write their own “books” about themselves and present them to whomsoever they please.

From an Islamic point view, we can bridge the “mutual understanding gap” between Islam and the religions of the East by recognizing the following principles:

1 - Islam and the Eastern religions – whether Buddhist, Hindu or Shinto – all share a deep respect for the environment and the natural world. Thus Islam finds itself in total harmony with all the religions of the East. For example, where the attitude to plants is concerned, I as a Muslim can cite numerous verses from the Qur'an and Sayings of the Prophet which urge mankind to conserve the environment and accord plants special treatment, even in times of war, as part of the ethics and “etiquette” of war in Islam. However, I should prefer to give you some actual examples of Muslim behaviour towards plants and the environment.

The Sufi Ibn 'Arabi (1164-1240) has given us a wonderful concept of “companionship” between man and plants, based on a principle which he described as “companionship with other forms and other species (other than humans).” What he meant by this was that “companionship” did not just represent ties between a person and others of his or her kind (i.e. a human-human relationship). It also covered relationships between man and other species – human-plant, human-animal etc. This was what he meant when he spoke about humans and their “companionship with the animals and trees they

possess, as well as with those with which they come into contact, even if they do not own them.” In other words, ownership of a thing or a living creature was not a precondition for a “companionable relationship” with it. Rather, “companionship” merely required that other, non-human species – whether plants or animals – should be treated with gentleness, mercy and kindness. It was incumbent upon every human being “if [he] should see a tree withering for lack of water, even if its owner is present, and if he is able to water it [in his capacity] as its ‘companion of that hour’ (seeing that he has benefited from its shade or leant against it to rest, or stood near it for some purpose or other), then considering that all these actions represent companionship and he is capable of providing water, it is his duty to respect the claim of companionship and water it accordingly...not for the sake of its owner, nor out of a desire to benefit from its fruit, whether or not it should bear fruit and whether or not it is someone’s private property.”⁵

Something similar is reported about the Omani Imam Ahmed bin Sa’id al Sa’idi al ‘Azdi (r. 1741-1782). The historian Ibn Ruzaiq (d.1873 CE) records that Imam Ahmad’s high moral character was such that one day before he left Muscat he wanted to go to Sumail for some purpose. When he was near Wadi Halfain he found that the sun was blazing brightly, so he retreated to the shade of a large tree. Then after the sun’s decline he continued his journey to Sumail. Years later he set off from Rustaq to go to Nizwa accompanied by a large number of people on

⁵ Muhiyi al-Din Ibn Arabi, *Alfutuhah Almakkiya* (in Arabic), Dar Sadir, Vol: 3, Beyrouth, 2004, p. 334.

camels and horses. When he found himself in Wadi Halfain he looked to the right and the left and did not see that large tree. So he said to himself: "Perhaps it has died." Then he set off in its direction on his camel and found it was no more than a dried-up stump, and the sun was blazing hot. So he dismounted from his camel and made the camel sit with him, and he ordered that a carpet should be laid near the dried-up stump of the tree and dismissed his riding companions in that intense heat. So the riders were astounded by him.

When he arrived in Nizwa one of the *qadis* (judges) who had accompanied him on the journey asked him why he had stayed by the dried-up stump of the tree, so he told him that he had sat in the shade of its branches in the days when it was green. The judge said to him: "Do you honour something that cannot understand and is dead?" He replied: "A free man is one who does not forget an act of kindness. A person who forgets an act of kindness is not a free man. A free man should not forget an act of kindness either from something that speaks or from something that is dumb." So the judge said: "Let it suffice for me. These are indeed words of wisdom that an intelligent free man should not forget."⁶

⁶ Muhammad b. Humayd Ibn Ruzayk, *Alfath Almoubin Fi Sirat Al-Sada Al-Bu Sa'idiyin* (in Arabic), ed., Abd al-Mun'im 'Amir and Muhammad Murci Abdallah, Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, Muscat, 2001, p. 311-312. See the translation of the text on; George. P Badger, *The History of Imams and Seyyid of Oman* by Salil Ibn Ruzayq from A.D 661-1856, Hackluyt, 1871.

Likewise the Prophetic Tradition says: "Plant trees, even if the Angel of Death should find you in the farm."⁷

So this is the first principle of the Silk Road interfaith dialogue.

The second principle concerns the attitudes to animals. One reported that example of Imam Sultan bin Sayf al Ya'rubī's high moral character was his love of horses. He did not like his horse to be fed unless he himself was present, because he was afraid it might be not given enough to eat. In the month of Ramadhan, after praying the *Maghrib* (Sunset) Prayer he would feed his horse before himself; he would stand feeding the horse until it had had enough, then he would return to his fort with his wife and the members of his household.⁸

2 – Another common basis for dialogue between Islam and the Eastern religions is the fact that they all expect man to hold himself to account and blame himself when appropriate for the sake of his own peace of mind and spirit. In both Islam and the Eastern religions a person seeks solace through "internalised spiritual prayer". *Tasawwuf* (Sufism/mysticism) is a journey man makes into his innermost self in order to discover its well-springs that never run dry. The Eastern religions, too, have a tendency to "inward-lookingness" in which man looks into his essential self in order to find spiritual solace.

⁷ Abu Rabi' Al-Wissyani, *Siyar Al-Wissyani* (in Arabic), ed., 'Umar Luqman Asbana, , v. 1, p. 369 Muscat: Ministry of Heritage and Culture, 2009.

⁸ Nur al-Din Abdullah b. Humayd Al-Salimi, *Tuhfat Al- Ayyan Bi-Sirat Ahl Oman*, v. 1, p. 154-155, Muscat: Ministry of National Heritage and Culture, 1981.

Surprisingly people are seeking a third yardstick for defining worldly success (other than money and power), and are beginning to look to “meditation”, “wonder at the world around them” and “wisdom”, according to the most widely-sold book in America: *Thrive: The Third Metric to Redefining Success and Creating a Life of Well-Being, Wisdom and Wonder*, by the American thinker Arianna Huffington. Today in particular, Islam and the Eastern religions offer a secure, sound and practicable way to achieve success – that is to say, true success, not mere toilsome, wearisome material success with its uncertain results and consequences.⁹

For example, between Islam and Buddhism, Johan Elversorg (2010) - argues this understanding can only be achieved by a re-examination of the narratives that reinforce prejudices and plant the seeds of mutual suspicion between the two cultures. He notes that it is the function of the objective historian to overcome and discredit prejudices. Otherwise, how will Buddhists and Muslims be able to understand each other?

Will the two sides develop a new hybrid culture containing both Islamic and Buddhist elements? Are we on the threshold of a new era of Buddhist-Islamic cultural exchange? Or will the dissimilarities between them lead to their opposite, and to open conflict? The author's response to these questions is that nobody can guess what will happen. However, he adds that one thing is

⁹ Arianna Huffington, *Thrive: The Third Metric to Redefining Success and Creating a Life of Well-Being, Wisdom and Wonder*, New York, Harmony, 2014 .

certain - that is, that interaction between the Buddhist and Islamic cultures is still at its early stages.¹⁰

3 - Silk was not the only factor that determined the Silk Road's identity. Ideas also played a part. The Silk Road is a network of historic trading routes linking the Far East with South Asia and South-East Asia with Europe and the Mediterranean. However, what we almost forget is that silk was not the only substance that was transported between the countries along the way, since there were also exchanges of other products which travelled along those roads, including religions and philosophies. Cultural exchanges have invariably included the adoption of - and adaptation to - different ways of life and behaviour. If we appreciate this fact we will be better able understand the connotations that the term "Silk Road" enjoys today and why there is still a certain mystique associated with it.

3- The New Silk Road: the Future of Trade and the Future of Human Intercommunication

Robert Kaplan 2010 hypothesis on the new global strategic has occurred due the political and economic developments in Indian Ocean in the last decades. However, these developments would shift the centre of international trade from north Atlantic to Indian Ocean. This hypothesis gives a new dimension for understanding on the global political situation post cold war.¹¹

¹⁰ Johan Elversorg, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road, op. cit.

¹¹ Robert Kaplan, Monsoon The Indian Ocean and The Future American Power, Random House, 2010.

Hillary Clinton put forward a vision of “the New Silk Road” from the Near East to the Far East based on co-operation and collaboration in areas of trade, research and intellectual development. Speaking on 9th July 2012, her Deputy Assistant Secretary Geoffrey Pyatt described a strategy for “reconnecting” those countries which had been “torn apart by decades of war and rivalry – for example, the USA, India, Japan and Afghanistan” - and he stressed that co-operation could be achieved through increased trade flow and dialogue between opinion-formers at every level, whether industrial, diplomatic or educational. He observed that the word “geography” was “problematic” and was generally used to prevent, rather than promote, dialogue between representatives of different countries. Hence it was necessary to construct an “open and integrated” framework for dialogue.

Robert O. Blake Jr, Assistant Secretary of State at the US State Department, gave a speech on 13th March 2013 in which he said that the “Silk Road Strategy” was largely dependent upon the active participation of the states concerned. He stressed the need for better cultural understanding, since along with the exchange of basic commodities there was another kind of exchange that was no less important – the exchange of ideas.

Parallel to this, in 2013, the Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the widely publicized “Belt and Road” or “New Silk Road” initiative – an idea clearly inspired by the old Silk Road that flourished until the dawn of the modern age and was only brought to an end by the violence and wars that afflicted maritime trade in the Indian Ocean and its neighbouring regions after the sixteenth century. His

motive was not mere nostalgia for the past, since the project, which marked a major new cultural departure, was essentially forward-looking and designed to promote a better future for a mankind yearning for closer mutual relations, prosperity and peace.

There has been talk of a new Silk Road for more than a hundred years. Throughout that time there have been ideas and initiatives aimed at reviving its old commercial and economic role as part of a strategy to promote peace and co-operation across those vast continents and oceans which in recent centuries have suffered the effects of hostile relations, wars and embargoes, while travellers by land and sea have tried to explore those parts of it which still exist. This is a praiseworthy aim, particularly since the area covered by it extends over half the surface of the globe (around sixty percent, to be more precise!).

Following the launch of the 'Belt of and Road' initiative, in March 2014 the Chinese government issued a booklet on the project entitled *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building the Silk Road Economic Belt*, which described in detail the steps that had already been taken and called upon all interested parties to join up and take part. According to the booklet, the Silk Road Economic Belt aims to establish three main routes: the first route would link China with Europe through Central Asia and Russia; the second would extend from China to the Gulf region and the Mediterranean through Central and West Asia; and the third would run from China and through South Asia and the Indian Ocean. According to the plan, much of the twenty-first century maritime Silk Road will be based on the old sea lanes. It would follow two routes: the first will

extend from the Chinese coastal ports to the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea, then on to the shores of Europe, while the second will link China's ports with the South Pacific. This means that the routes of the new Silk Road will run through and link over sixty countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, while connecting some four and a half billion people with economies totalling up to a trillion US Dollars – i.e. around thirty percent of the current volume of the global economy.

The first stage of the plan entails a series of road and railway construction projects in the regions along the new Silk Road's overland routes. These will be essential in order to guarantee the smooth passage of air, sea and land freight and ensure that the countries located on and within these giant communication networks work together in laying oil and gas pipelines and establishing cross-border power supply connections, as well as telecommunications cables for what the Chinese booklet calls the "Information Silk Road".¹² The huge range of exciting – and massive - development projects requires massive financial support which can only be made available through international co-operation. China's response to this situation has been twofold. It set up the Silk Road Fund to channel investment into specific projects, and established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). So far around sixty countries from the five continents have signed up as founder members of the AIIB, including most major industrial nations apart from

¹² James A. Millward, *The Silk Road: a Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New-York, 2013, p. 82-86.

the United States, Japan and Canada. Among the Arab states that have joined are Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt. According to Xue Qingguo, Dean of the Department of Arabic Studies at Beijing Foreign Studies University, the participation of countries with opposing political views in this global project is clear evidence of a “meeting of interests” and shows that it is possible to overcome differences for the sake of a more prosperous, secure and co-operative world.

Of course, the most obvious aspects of the Chinese initiative are economic and trade-related. However, its human and interactive/cultural/intellectual aspects are no less important, since it will foster cultural, intellectual, academic and media exchanges. With this aim in mind, China has offered ten thousand scholarships for students from across the world – or, more specifically, from those countries located along the initiative’s routes - to study at Chinese universities specialising in technology, economics, cultural disciplines, the media and communications. China has also started running a series of cultural programmes in collaboration with the countries that are involved in the project.

Professor Xue Qingguo has posed the following questions on the project and attempted to answer them:

1 – Why is the initiative happening now? 2 – What is the initiative’s significance for Arab countries in the light of the upheavals currently being faced by the region? 3 – Why are the United States and some of its allies not signing up

to the initiative, and does this indicate a new polarisation?
4 – Is this initiative different from the untamed globalisation process that many countries are complaining about; in other words, will the initiative be gentler and more humane?

With its financial and monetary resources and high levels of productivity, China today is the world's second economy after the United States. Having leapt from one world to another, its economic development has encountered some problems, such as a productivity glut that has cut demand for new goods and commodities in the local markets. It also faces difficulties in its trade with Western countries because of their protective counter-measures. All these factors mean that there is a need for a new impetus for sustainable growth, and this in turn requires a high level of interaction, unhampered by disputes (or at least with an ability to overcome them). All problems and difficulties, however great they may be, can be overcome by a rational, broad-minded approach. In the Chinese view, the initiative is not a project to be imposed by force of arms, or even by the devices of economic globalization. Countries should join it voluntarily and benefit from doing so – rather than suffer harm from not doing so. It is true that it is an association initiated by China, but it creates links between countries near and far, while respecting local cultures, conditions and customs. Indeed, it propagates different languages and cultures just as the old Silk Road did in the past.

Moreover, in addition to its important role of promoting human contacts and interaction, the initiative has also

given a boost to the advanced economies while helping to resolve the problem of capital shortfalls in the economies of those developing countries along its routes that have signed up to it. One consequence of this is that the countries whose economies are thus interlinked will lay their disputes and conflicts to one side and set their sights on a new world of mutual understanding through interaction and exchange, in the interests of prosperity and a better future for mankind.

In the view of Arab experts, the Arab countries which have joined the initiative – or intend to join – are not aligning themselves with China or against America, because the New Silk Road is inclusive and represents a new model for economic and human relations. Indeed, it may well turn out to be a new and constructive model in a more optimistic world of waning conflicts in which political and strategic polarisation can become a thing of the past. Where the Arabs are concerned, it may represent a historic revival of an era in which they travelled overland to the Far East through Central Asia and Turkestan, or plied the Indian Ocean, establishing states and civilizations along its shores and developing relations with East and South-East Asia and the Indian sub-continent in a region free from conflicts and wars. Even if the above is not an answer to the above question about polarisation, it does at least point to other possibilities for the Arab states and the peoples of Asia, Africa and Europe. At the very least, it offers an example of “freedom from polarisation”, even if this does not mean “freedom from competition”, since it is based upon the principle of mutual dependence and a recognition that the world shares a common destiny.

Today the Arab countries are suffering from internal strife as well as conflicts with their neighbours and the outside world. At the same time, the New Silk Road offers great prospects for economic growth that will lead to lower levels of conflict, as well as opportunities for the kinds of exchanges that are conducive to better relations. The developing Arab states will benefit from the modern communications systems, the free economic zones, the oil and gas transportation networks and the water supply channels. And above all, they will benefit from the huge opportunities for cultural co-operation and human contacts. In such a situation there will be no room for “conflict for the sake of conflict”; in fact, everyone can be a winner in a world – and a region – of waning conflicts. The Arabs – and the wider world – need to embrace the principles of co-operation, exchanges of benefits and common interests. Those were the values and practices that defined the spirit of the old Silk Road and enabled it to function as a channel for the transport of goods between the Far East, China, the Levant and the Mediterranean. In its modern incarnation, today’s Chinese initiative offers a shared spiritual element that – in our view - can add a new dimension to Chinese and Asian-Arab relationship. Here I am referring not to the volume of goods traded, which is massive, but to the spirit of development – that is to say, the resolution of problems through material and human development. This is the distinctive quality of the Chinese Renaissance – a quality that can also help revive the Arabs’ fortunes if they co-operate and collaborate within the great human community created by the Chinese initiative.

China and East Asia – not surprisingly – are benefiting from the initiative. After all, it provides an additional channel for the transport and marketing of Eastern goods. However, the Arabs and Africans are also benefiting enormously; or rather, they can benefit enormously if they agree to work together and co-operate in the interests of growth, development and an end to backwardness and strife, and seize the excellent opportunities for cultural and human interaction with China and the Far East.

4 – Why did the Silk Road never die?

First and foremost, the Silk Road is a cultural phenomenon and people look back to it nostalgically because throughout the years of its existence it was always a road of cultural intercommunication par excellence. The worlds of Ibn Battutah, Sulaiman al Tajir al Omani and Mahmud al Kashgari were not fantasy worlds; nor were there any conflicts in their day between the countries along the Silk Road. If the will and commitment are there, our present-day New Silk Road will help create a world of peace, progress, co-operation and solidarity.

Countries along the Silk Road have generally learnt how to co-operate with each other through a process of “adaptation”. In 2003 the President of the International Black Sea University in Tbilisi noted that adaptation was “the only way for people to learn to tolerate different opinions and ideas.” He added: “The main cause of current conflicts is due to the fact that human beings fail to get to know each other.”

By “getting to know each other” we can revive the spirit of the Great Silk Road and generate “cultural richness through positive interaction”.

If we understand this, it will come as no surprise to us to learn that the academic Victoria Bledsloe sees the history of the Silk Road as one involving both cultural and commercial negotiation.

In this connection another scholar is quoted as saying:

“The history of the Silk Road's religions is part of a broader history - the history of intercultural dialogue. That dialogue became possible thanks to the development of a strong network of ties between individuals who possessed enough commercial skills and a sufficient spirit of adventure to enable them to overcome the difficulties of intercommunication and the perils of travel through the great Eurasian continent.”

At the end of his book James A. Millward wonders: “Why did the Silk Road never die?” One answer he suggests is that the Silk Road was never just a trade route; it was also an “ideas route”. So it was not merely a road for transporting goods and this was the reason why it never died. Even if we were to suppose that in one sense it died from the end of the fifteenth century, religions still travelled along it during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and there was a lively spiritual scene along its entire length.¹³

¹³ James A. Millward, *The Silk Road: a Very Short Introduction*, p. 94, Oxford University Press, New-York, 2013.

Mongol Patronage of Trade between China and the Middle East during the Middle Ages*

Mustafa UYAR**

In this paper I offer a general historical perspective concerning the significance of trade and thus the Silk Road in the Chinggis Khan Empire, which was one of the largest states in history.

In the process of establishing the empire that stretched from China to Eastern Europe and Northern Africa in a very short time, Chinggis Khan (1206- 1227) was responsible for massacres and massive destruction of cities in the Middle East, Near East, Anatolia and Eastern Europe. Almost all the written sources in the Mediaeval Ages depict his destructive and devastating activities. The emergence of Chinggis Khan disturbed the balance across the globe and led to a new era in the known world at that time.

Chinggis Khan and other Mongol khans were vicious and sanguinary during their invasions; the main reason for that was *strategy*. Therefore, their activities can no longer be explained through *barbarism*. Given his aim of

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“conquering the world”, Chinggis Khan placed small garrisons to the regions that he seized in order to continue his invasions. In these regions, he annihilated all the people who had the potential to rebel against his limited number of troops and stab the main forces in the back. He also destroyed buildings and other structures and whole cities for two strategic reasons: 1) Buildings limit the mobility of mounted nomads, 2) Residential and agricultural areas that belong to settled societies reduced grasslands, which were food source of the nomads’ animals. The result of Chinggis Khan’s invasions based on this strategy had devastating consequences.

As the empire expanded, the Mongols blended in with the settled culture; the resulting cultural exchange led to a change in the needs and administration of the empire. Turkish, Chinese and Persian statesmen that entered the service of the empire advised Mongol khans about the ideal structure of administration and economy. The most significant of the advices was that “the empire was founded on horseback but it cannot be governed from there”. Since it had become evident that the fortunes acquired through plundering would not be available in the long run and there was a need to find a source of sustainable financial support¹.

Mongol khans, princes and princesses, who became prosperous due to conquered lands and spoils, wished to access more illustrious wealth. With their luxurious goods and glorious wealth they wanted to prove themselves to

¹ Virgil Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, trans. Samuel Willcocks, Leiden, Boston, 2012, p. 9.

their subjects and foes and hoped to gain respect. In addition, in order to produce effective weapons the army needed new technologies and iron that were not easily accessible to nomads. Briefly, the Mongolian nomadic economy was not autarchic; in other words, the empire was not self-sufficient².

The need of the ruling hierarchy for greater wealth and recognition allowed those with talents and from particular professions as artisans, scientists and merchants could save themselves from death. When the Mongols entered a city, they identified these professional groups, ensured their security and escorted them to Mongolian capitals.

From these three professional groups, this paper focuses on the merchants. As in the earlier Asiatic-nomadic states, merchants were very important in the Chinggis Khan Empire because merchants provided benefits in addition to their provision of necessary goods, for example, they conveyed information about distant countries such as their geography, climate and trade routes. Furthermore, merchants spoke the language of the people with whom they made commercial contact³. Finally, they understood issues of economics and finance. It was due to these characteristics that the merchants earned a significant reputation, and were sent as envoys to foreign

² A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, London, 1983, pp. 68-84; 202-1; Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", *Asia Major, Third Series*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1989), 83-126, p. 83.

³ Xinru Liu, *The Silk Road in World History*, Oxford, 2010, p. 123.

countries, took part in state administration and served as spies⁴.

For Chinggis Khan and his successors there were great obstacles to gaining the merchants on their side since the Mongol khans, at least in the early times, were considered as *usurpers*. Merchants needed to consider whether they and their valuable goods would be safe when they visited a country controlled by a Mongol khan. Furthermore, the Mongol khan's countries were far from the centers of production and there were very few customers in this country. Considering these aspects, was the possible trade with Mongol khans profitable? What did the rulers, who ruled over the production centers and trade routes, think about the trade activities of Mongols? Would these rulers allow the passage of tools, goods and iron that were needed by Mongols?

The Mongol rulers were aware of all these issues and, they took a radical decision to resolve them: First Chinggis Khan gave orders to his guards (*qoruqchiyān*) and army commanders to ensure the safety of all visiting merchants⁵ by clearing the bandits from the routes along which the merchants travelled. Second the Mongols sent envoys to countries, located on trade routes, in order to acquire a safe passage to the Mongol countries.

In 1218 Chinggis Khan sent an envoy to Sultān Muḥammad (1200-1221) of the Khwārazm-Shāh Empire

⁴ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 124.

⁵ 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, Translated from the Text of Mirza Muhammad Qazvini by John Andrew Boyle, Cambridge-Massachusetts, 1958. Vol. 1, p. 78.

and demanded a safe passage for merchants⁶. He also sent delegates to Möngke-Temür (1267-1280) of Golden Horde and Yaroslav, Prince of Novgorod and asked them to facilitate passages of merchants⁷.

To facilitate the journeys of merchants Mongol khans gave them privileges. For example, Chinggis Khan established the *yam* which was a network for communication and postal services. This communication system consisted of fast horses and riders to cover particular distances. A rider with an important message reached a point where he could change his horse and ride on to another point. In this way important news could be rapidly delivered from one end of the empire to the other⁸. These *yam* points were also responsible for helping merchants; if the merchants found themselves in difficulties could use the horses at any *yam* stop to continue their journey⁹. Moreover, in Chinese lands, *yam* headquarters were established for only the merchants to use¹⁰.

In order to support the merchants, the Mongol khans accepted high prices for the purchased goods. This strategy was used to overcome the problem that the Mongolian capital was far away and thus was not an attractive destination for merchants due to cost of transportation. In 1217/1218 Chinggis Khan warmly

⁶ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 89.

⁷ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 84.

⁸ Paul D. Buell, *Historical Dictionary of the Mongol World Empire*, Lanham, Maryland, and Oxford, 2003, pp. 168-169.

⁹ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", pp. 96-97.

¹⁰ Buell, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 168.

welcomed a merchant from Bukhārā and paid the excessive price that he demanded. The Khan's aim was to encourage other merchants to come to their realm from Mā warā' al-nahr (Transoxiana)¹¹. Later Chinggis's son Ögedei Khan (1229-1241) issued a decree, ordering that one tenth of the asking price of the goods should be paid to the merchants additionally, because he considered that merchants contributed greatly to the imperial treasure and fulfilment of the needs of the empire and the khans¹². In some case, the payment made by the Mongol khans could be two times more than the actual price. The Golden Horde ruler Batu (1240-1255) also offered to pay high prices to merchants¹³. Similarly, Batu's brother, Berke Khan, offered double the asking price to Venetian merchants for some types of jewelry¹⁴.

In terms of taxes the Mongol khans would collect less tax from the merchants and thus subsidized them¹⁵. In the early times of the empire, the merchants' tax *tamgha* was kept low and prior to the reign of Möngke Khan (1251-1259), these taxes were not properly supervised. Merchants could be exempted from taxes due to their close relations with ruler and his circle. However, Möngke

¹¹ Juvaini, *the World-Conqueror*, Vol. 1, pp. 78-79; Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", pp. 88, 96.

¹² Juvaini, *the World-Conqueror*, Vol. 1, p. 214; Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", pp. 95, 103.

¹³ Juvaini, *the World-Conqueror*, Vol. 1, p. 267; Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 104.

¹⁴ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 107.

¹⁵ Juvaini, *the World-Conqueror*, Vol. 2, p. 606.

Khan facilitated the collection of *tamgha* tax from merchants on a regular basis¹⁶.

Another way for Mongol Empire to support merchants was by being a trade partner itself. This partnership required provision of capital to merchants. Mongol khans and Mongolian aristocracy granted particular amount of gold and silver bullion (*bālish*) to merchants or potential merchants. Chinggis Khan ordered his sons, daughters and wives to support the Muslim merchants coming from the Khwārazmian lands with this gold and silver bullion¹⁷. Thus, the khans supported trade in terms of capital and gained profit from the trade. The Mongols called the merchants with whom they shared profits *ortoq/ortaq* (the Turkish word for *partner*)¹⁸. Although the process of profit distribution and capital withdrawal was not clear. We know that merchants prospered using this capital and even began to engage in usury with this money and there were complaints about merchants' lending money at high interest rates¹⁹.

Due to their extensive knowledge of financial issues merchants were authorized to collect taxes in some parts of the empire. For example, at the beginning of 1240, the task of collecting tax in Northern China was given a Muslim merchant, called 'Abd al-Raḥmān²⁰.

¹⁶ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 107.

¹⁷ Juvaini, *the World-Conqueror*, Vol. 1, pp. 78-79; Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 88; Ciocîltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade*, p. 38.

¹⁸ Buell, *Historical Dictionary*, p. 208.

¹⁹ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 99.

²⁰ Allsen, "Mongolian Princes and Their Merchant Partners", p. 101.

The Mongolian capital Qaraqorum, founded on the bank of the Orkhon River, had become almost a commercial warehouse. Ögedei Khan employed thousands of artisans recruited from Transoxiana and China. This meant that the Silk Road, which was for transportation of silk and other goods from Iran, Transoxiana and China to Qaraqorum, maintained its significance²¹.

The Mongols were very fond of a particular type of fabric, made of gold and silk called *nasīj*; they purchased it abundantly. They liked gold work of Iran, and Transoxiana and preferred to buy high quality silk from China. In his attempts to collect these products Ögedei Khan gathered about 3,000 artisan families from Transoxiana, who produced gilded silk fabric, and resettled them in the city of Xunmalin in northern China. This meant that high quality Chinese silk with gold work allowed the world's finest quality gilded fabrics to be produced under Mongolian patronage²².

As these developments were taking place in the eastern end of the empire, a significant commercial city was flourishing in Tabrīz at the western end of the empire. From the mid-13th century till the end of 16th century, Tabrīz was nearly the most important city of Iran. The city was the capital of Mongol Empire from the reign of Ilkhan Abaqa (1265-1282). However, the most glorious time of Tabrīz, was during the reign of Ghazan Khan. The Ilkhanate (The Mongols of Iran) capital Tabrīz was a center for the merchants who travelled around Europe and

²¹ Liu, *The Silk Road*, p. 119.

²² Liu, *The Silk Road*, p. 120.

the Far East. It had geographic and climatic properties that could not only host Mongol nomadic culture but also to allow the Mongols with nomadic-sheep farming economy, to survive and to achieve the riches of a settled agriculture society²³.

The necessities of Eurasia trade in the Middle Ages, in which merchants of the city-states such as Venice and Genoa, brought a commercial activity and wealth to Tabrīz that it had never seen before and never would after. Venetian merchants existed in Tabrīz since 1262 and the Genovese came to the city in 1280. This international trade, in which Italian city-states had a great share, became so enormous that the Mongol government was not able to control it. The government tried to put a banknote called *chao/chāw* into circulation, but global commercial circles did not accept it. According to Western contemporary sources, Tabrīz had the highest tariffs in the region. In addition to goods that were imported and exported, the city's own products aroused great interest in Europe. For example, a □*irāz*²⁴ that belonged to Abū Sa'īd Khan era (1316-1335) was purchased by an Italian

²³ Patrick Wing, ““Rich in Goods and Abounding in Wealth:” The Ilkhanid and Post-Ilkhanid Ruling Elite and the Politics of Commercial Life at Tabriz, 1250-1400”, *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th - 15th Century Tabriz*, ed. Judith Pfeiffer, Oxford 2014, 301-320, pp. 302-303.

²⁴ A Persian loan word means “adornment” or “embellishment”, original meaning of the term is “embroidery” or “decorative work” on a garment or piece of fabric. It later came to mean a *khil'at*, a robe of honor, richly adorned with elaborate embroidery, especially in the form of embroidered bands with writing upon them. Nasser Rabbat, “□*irāz*”, *The Encyclopedia of Islam (Second Edition)*, Leiden, 2000, Vol. 10, 534-538, p. 534.

merchant in Tabrīz and taken to Europe subsequently, it was used as the coffin of Rudolph IV²⁵.

Finally, I would like to remind the listeners that the Chinggis Khan invasion, which devastated Mediaeval Eurasia, began with the “Utrār Catastrophe”²⁶ and spread along the Silk Road²⁷. The Utrār Catastrophe was the massacre of 450 merchants by a governor of the Khwārazm-Shāh Empire; the merchants had been sent by Chinggis Khan in 1218. In a way, this was the beginning of a devastating sequence of invasions began along the Silk Road as a result of Chinggis Khan’s desire to control this route and the trade on it.

²⁵ Sheila S. Blair, “Tabriz: International Entrepôt under the Mongols”, *Politics, Patronage and the Transmission of Knowledge in 13th - 15th Century Tabriz*, ed. Judith Pfeiffer, Oxford, 2014, 321-356, pp. 332-333.

²⁶ W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, London, 1928, pp. 397-398.

²⁷ Ciociltan, *The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade*, p. 37.

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Caravanserais and the Security Problems of the Anatolian Silk Road in the Seljuk Period

Ahmet Samil GURER*

Before going on to describe the major topic of this presentation, the security problems of the Silk Road in Anatolia in the Seljuk period, I will take a general look at the historical significance of the Silk Road.

As it is well known the oldest and the most important international trade route of the ancient and medieval world was “The Silk Road” which extended from China Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Until the discovery of new maritime routes in the late 15th century, this vast road across Central Asia connected the North of China with the Mediterranean in the South of Europe, passing through Turkestan and the Middle East. The Silk Road ended in the Eastern Mediterranean ports and goods were transported by ships to southern European ports and those of North Africa. Over the course of time, lesser trade routes of north and those of South connected to the Silk Road and it became world’s largest road network (Diyarbakirli, 1992: 171).

The Silk Road was one of the factors which contributed to the development of world’s major

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civilizations. It was not simply a trade route on which precious commercial goods were transported. It was also a cultural link between the faraway cultures of world. By means of the Silk Road, ideas, technology, religions, languages, various lifestyles and even diseases were transferred to faraway places (Dinç et al., 2012: 4312).

This trade route was financially so precious that local powers' appetites to establish control over it caused political and military conflicts, as was the case of the Han Chinese and the Turkic Hsiungnu Empires. And later Turkish and East Roman Empires formed military alliances against the Sassanids to share tax revenues paid by caravans passing through western Turkestan (Liu, 2010: 82; Diyarbakirli, 1992: 173).

The major route of the Silk Road was the southern highway which linked China across Central Asia; Iran, Mesopotamia, Syria and Anatolia to Mediterranean ports (Bozkurt, 2000 : 369). That means one of the ending points of southern highway was Anatolia which was under the control of the Eastern Roman Empire until the end of the early medieval period. Anatolia, a bridge between Asia and Europe, was on one of the important geographical locations of the historical Silk Roads reaching to the Mediterranean.

However political instability caused by Byzantium's struggles with the Sassanids and Arabs prevented regular use of this part of the Silk Road for centuries. Anatolia under the administration of Byzantine Empire was in serious economical crisis and unaware of world trade in the 11th century. Domestic problems of the Empire such as weakening of central administration, sectarian conflicts

between Orthodox and Armenian Churches, frequent revolts of local authorities and Arabic attacks to the South eastern borders of the Empire left Anatolia out of international trade for a centuries (Turan, 1980: 162; Çetin, 2011: 214).

Precious furs of the North, Indian textile products and Chinese silks were distributed to Arabic countries via Khwarezm and Persia instead of Anatolia. On the other hand, Arabic conquests of eastern and western shores of Mediterranean changed routes of maritime trade in the Mediterranean. Anatolian ports which were controlled by the Byzantines were not as busy as they had been in the past (Çetin, 2011: 214)

According to Osman Turan, a prominent historian, Turkish conquests changed the fate of the international trade routes passing through Anatolia (Turan, 1980: 162). The Battle of Manzikert (1071), which was one of the turning points in the Turkish history, marked the beginning of Turkish presence in Anatolia. Turkish advance westward was so rapid that only seven years later the Anatolian Seljuk State (or Seljuk Sultanate of Rum) was founded in Nikomedia (İznik), close to the Marmara Sea, that used to be an important city of the Byzantine Empire. However the Crusades and Byzantine resistance interrupted this expansion in the early 12th century. The Seljuks retreated to central Anatolia and the capital city was moved to Konya (Önge, 2007: 51-52).

During the years following the Myriokephalon Battle (1176), which reduced the Byzantine military power, most of the Anatolian lands came under the control of the Seljuks. During the period of political stability which would

continue until 1248, the Seljuk Sultans adopted a policy of reviving international trade in Anatolia. Their conquest policy was mainly shaped by this economic policy.

In particular, three sultans contributed to the revival of international trade by conquering some important port cities on the coasts of Mediterranean and Black Sea. Gıyaseddin Keyhüsrev who seized Antalya, an important Mediterranean port, also set a series of regulations to attract foreign merchants. Later İzzettin Keykavus conquered Sinop, another important port city on the Black Sea coast. He also signed commercial negotiations with the Kingdom of Cyprus and granted some commercial and legal privileges to Venetian merchants. The most important attempts at developing international trade in Anatolia were in the period of Sultan Alaaddin Keykubad, who was considered the greatest ruler of the Anatolian Seljuks. He seized Kolonaros (Alanya) a port city close to Antalya (Önge, 2007: 52; Güçlüay, 2002: 569-574).

Following conquests of these important ports, international trade routes in Anatolia regained their previous importances. Increasing commercial traffic on the connecting trade routes uncovered the problem of providing security of caravans passing through these roads. As it was in all the main parts of world, trade was a tiring and dangerous task in Anatolia during the medieval ages. The caravans transporting precious commercial commodities were under the risk of being robbed by bandits, forces of rival principalities or nomadic Turkomans. Providing security of these caravans was vitally important for continuation of international trade in the Seljuk territory.

Throughout history security of the caravans was the most important problem for the merchants, especially at night when the caravan people needed to rest. Host states and tradesmen tried to solve this vital problem with various methods. Caravan owners sometimes hired private guards against bandits. But this method added a new financial burden to the commercial trip. The host states like Chinese and Mongolians on the silk road built watchtowers and postal stations or deployed military forces (Haksöz 2012: 20).

The most effective solution for this problem, rediscovered by the Seljuks, was constructing accommodations called caravanserais. These were constructed along the important trade routes of Anatolia at 30 to 40 kilometer intervals, an average day's journey of caravans (Diyarbakirli, 1992: 175). The caravanserais were not invented by the Anatolian Seljuks, but it can be easily said that they gained their perfect form and function during their period. First of all they were stone and fortified buildings which could even resist attacks of armies, as in the case of an incident in 14th. century. After the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in 1243, a Turkish prince, İlyas Bey, revolted against the Mongols and took refuge in Alaaddin Keykubad Caravanserai close to Aksaray. For nearly two months, he resisted against a Mongolian army composed of 20.000 soldiers and equipped with catapults (Çetin 2012: 216-217).

As well as their hardness, caravanserais were accommodations to meet all the needs of merchants and travellers.. Some important services such as dormitories, dining halls, warehouses, stores, barns, haylofts, masjids,

bath, fountains, hospitals and pharmacies, shoemakers and blacksmiths were provided in these caravansaries. (Hülagü, 9).

The travellers and caravan people utilized these services free of charge for three days (Büyükmihçi, 2012: 385). Because these accomodations, which were donations of Seljuk rulers, dynasty members, or prominent administrators, were financed by their foundations which had various sources of income (Önge 2007: 53).

According to estimations the Seljuks constructed nearly three hundreds caravanserais (Önge 2007: 53). The majority of the Anatolian caravanserais, which were originally called in the historical sources as *han* or *ribat*, were constructed between 1220 and 1250, at the height of the Anatolian Seljuk state (Yavuz 1997: 81). The largest ones were generally located on the trade route extending from the Mediterranean ports to the east, via Antalya, Konya, and Kayseri because it was a much used commercial route in Seljuk Anatolia (Önge 2007: 53).

In addition to caravanserais, the Seljuk sultans wishing to develop international trade offered the merchants a kind of insurance for financial safety. They assured their financial security by paying compensation from the state treasury in the case of losses caused by robbery (Liu, 2010: 106; Çetin 2012: 215).

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European Perspective of China's New Silk Road Strategy

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CHINA'S SILK ROAD PROJECT

The Silk Road Project, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, which was first put forward by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, is a Chinese initiative aiming to connect Asia and Europe by re-envisaging the concept of the historical Silk Road.

In line with China's "going out" policy, the Project aims to strengthen relations between China, Central Asia and Europe, and strengthen China's role in economic integration with related countries by building a network of transport connections, eliminating trade barriers, decreasing transaction costs and increasing economic competitiveness. It will also provide China with means to export its surplus manufacturing and push its indigenous technologies. It is reported that up to 60 countries may be included into the project.

Major Goals of the Initiative

The five major goals of the Silk Road initiative are: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.

In terms of policy co-ordination, countries along the Silk Road will fully coordinate their economic development strategies and policies, work out plans and measures for

regional cooperation, negotiate to solve cooperation-related issues, and jointly provide policy support for the implementation of practical cooperation and large-scale projects.

With regard to facilities connectivity, efforts will be made to improve the connectivity of transport, energy and communications infrastructure (land, air, sea routes, pipelines, telecommunication cables etc.), and form an infrastructure network between Asia, Europe and Africa.

Within the context of unimpeded trade, steps will be taken to improve investment and trade facilitation, promote economic integration and expand trade and investment areas between related countries. Efforts will be made to reduce barriers and costs related to investment and trade.

Regarding financial integration, efforts will be made to enhance bilateral and multilateral financial cooperation, build a currency stability system, expand the scope of currency exchange in trade and investment between countries along the Silk Road, strengthen financial regulation cooperation, and build a regional financial risk monitoring and managing system.

As for people-to-people bonds, action will be taken to promote exchanges in different areas between related countries and promote dialogue between the peoples, thus enhancing the spirit of friendly cooperation along the Silk Road.

The Overall Scope of the Initiative

Running through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, the Silk Road Project envisages the establishment of two

trade routes: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.

The land-based Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the Maritime Silk Road focuses on connecting China to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean; and connecting China coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific.

Accordingly, on land, the Initiative will focus on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors by taking advantage of international transport routes, relying on core cities along the Belt and Road and using key economic industrial parks as cooperation platforms.

At sea, the Initiative will focus on jointly building smooth, secure and efficient transport routes connecting major sea ports along the Belt and Road. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore require closer cooperation and greater progress.

Financing

The substantial OBOR funds is backed essentially by two financial institutions:

1. The Silk Road Fund

2. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

The Silk Road Fund

The US\$40 billion Silk Road Fund has been established to finance the Belt and Road Initiative. It will invest mainly in infrastructure and resources, as well as in industrial and financial cooperation. The Fund was set up as a limited liability company in December 2014. Its capital comes from different shareholders, including China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange, China Investment Corporation, the Export-Import Bank of China and China Development Bank. The Fund will comply with market rules and the international order of finance, welcoming participation from domestic and overseas investors, such as the China-Africa Development Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a new multilateral development bank (MDB), has been set up with a view to complementing and cooperating with the existing MDBs to jointly address infrastructure needs in Asia. AIIB will focus on the development of infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia, including energy and power, transportation and telecommunications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and logistics. China will provide much of the US\$100bn in proposed initial capital. At its announcement, it sought participation by other Asian governments and currently have 57 Founding Members.

In June 2015, 50 Prospective Founding Members of AIIB signed the Articles of Agreement in Beijing. The signatory countries were Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Recently, the articles were signed also by Malaysia, Thailand and Poland. The Articles will remain open for signing by the remaining four Prospective Founding Members until the end of 2015.

Historical Silk Road

The Silk Road was a network of trade routes, formally established during the Han Dynasty. The Silk Road began in China's ancient capital of Chang'an - today's Xi'an in Shaanxi province - and covered more than 4,000 kilometers within China, continuing westward through India and onward to Turkey and the eastern coast of the Mediterranean, providing access to ancient Rome.

The Silk Road, coined by German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877, was not just one road but rather a series of major trade routes that helped build trade and cultural ties between China, India, Persia, Arabia, Greece, Rome and Mediterranean countries.

Reaching its peak during the Tang Dynasty and later during the Yuan Dynasty, established by the Mongol Empire, the Silk Road lost its significance around the late 15th century with the discovery of trans-ocean sea routes.

Anatolia, due to its geographic location, functioned as a gate and bridge between west and east as well as a territory where various civilizations were founded and developed since ancient ages. Anatolia served as one of the most important junction points of Silk Road.

TURKEY & SILK ROAD

Since the Silk Road Project aims to connect Asia and Europe by re-envisioning the concept of the historical Silk Road, Turkey is situated in an important location. Turkey's geographical location functions as a bridge which connects Asia and Europe, in other words, the East and the West.

Turkey is not a stranger to concepts such as the Silk Road Project and has been promoting the revitalization of the ancient Silk Road. Turkey is actively participating in similar concepts and is founding member to organizations which have similar economic prospects.

1) Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)

Being the successor organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) which remained in existence from 1964 up to 1979, ECO was established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the Member States. In 1992, the Organization was expanded to include seven new members: Afghanistan, Republic of

Azerbaijan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Republic of Uzbekistan.

Within the ECO, an important agreement signed among the members on the facilitation of transit transport activities was the Transit Transport Framework Agreement (TTFA) which entered into force in 2006. This Agreement has been the main framework for transport cooperation among the members. Turkey has been following and contributing to the works of each ECO working group established for the implementation of the TTFA. Turkey also has been part of two container train projects, namely Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul (2009) and Istanbul-Almaty (2002) which were started in the ECO platform. Turkey also supported the ECO Silk Road Truck Caravan (2010).

2) Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA)

TRACECA is an intergovernmental programme which aims at developing international transport and ensuring socio-economic growth in the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia. The basis of the Programme has been established in 1993 at the Brussels Conference with the participation of the EU Commission and the Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Ukraine and Moldova joined the Programme in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey became TRACECA members in 2000, followed by Iran in 2009. Including Lithuania which obtained observer status at

TRACECA in 2009, the Programme covers 14 countries today.

TRACECA is a complex multi-modal transport system in countries of the region, which aims to develop economic and trade relations and transportation links between countries and regions that is a significant contribution to the revival of one of the most famous historical routes of the Silk Road.

Turkey is one of the most active members of TRACECA. Turkey continues the works to present its transport potential to the Eurasian transport network and prioritize the elimination of congestions at the international traffic and border crossings by implementing several projects including Marmaray, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, and high speed trains, divided roads, Black Sea Coastal Road, second tube crossing in Istanbul and 12 logistics centers around the country.

3) Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) came into existence as a unique and promising model of multilateral political and economic initiative with the signing of the Istanbul Summit Declaration and the Bosphorus Statement by the Heads of State and Government of the countries in the region, on 25 June 1992. With the entry into force of its Charter on 1 May 1999, BSEC acquired international legal identity and was transformed into a full-fledged regional economic organization known as the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

Aiming at fostering interaction and harmony among its members, as well as to ensure peace, stability and prosperity, encouraging friendly and good-neighborly relations in the Black Sea region, today BSEC serves as a forum for cooperation in a wide range of areas for its 12 Member States: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. The BSEC Headquarters is located in Istanbul.

Located between Asia, Middle East and Europe, the Black Sea region is an important junction of the historic Silk Road. Therefore Turkey has been contributing to important projects in the BSEC region. In relation to this, the US\$ 4.5 billion Black Sea Coastal Road, which runs parallel to Turkey's Black Sea coast and links up with the Georgian road network, and Marmaray, a rail tunnel linking Europe and Asia under the Bosphorus, are two significant examples of Turkey's contributions to the connectivity of the Black Sea Region. Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline are also important projects within this context.

4) Black Sea-Silk Road Corridor Project

The Black Sea – Silk Road Corridor (BSSRC) project, launched under the EU-funded Black Sea Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, has been developed to boost economic development along the Black Sea Silk Road trail through Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Greece, by improving tourism and the promotion of local services and products. Turkish Ministry for European Union Affairs has been a sponsor of this project.

5) Turkey's Silk Road Customs Cooperation Initiative/Caravanserai Project

In 2008, the Ministry of Customs and Trade of Turkey initiated a "Silk Road" initiative aiming to provide simplification and unification of customs formalities and to reconstruct the historical Silk Road as a link between European and Asian markets.

Turkey's Silk Road initiative was initiated in 2008 at the "International Forum on the Role of Customs Administration on Facilitating and Promoting Trade among Silk Road Countries" in Antalya, Turkey, which brought together representatives from 17 Silk Road countries (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, India, Iraq, Islamic Republic Of Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, People's Republic of China, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), as well as representatives from several international organizations, such as World Customs Administration (WCO), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), European Organization for Forwarding and Logistics (CLECAT) and International Road Transport Union (IRU). The Forum produced the Antalya Declaration in which concrete steps regarding simplification of border crossing procedures and trade facilitation were outlined.

The common goals pointed out in the declaration are as follows: achieving more transparent and streamlined customs formalities; strengthening collective and individual initiatives under the revitalization concept; endeavoring to establish border cooperation schemes with neighboring countries; improving customs-business partnership;

sharing experience among us on capacity building and anti-corruption in customs; exerting joint efforts to suppress illegal commercial activities and human trafficking; working on adherence to international conventions on facilitation; support for both regional and global trade facilitation efforts.

Accordingly, the next forum held in Baku, Azerbaijan, in 2009, launched the Caravanserai Project, which aimed to revitalize the ancient Silk Road and simplify customs procedures. The project takes its name from ancient “caravanserais” which were roadside inns where caravans riding on the ancient Silk Road could rest and recover to continue their journey. Caravanserais were supporting the flow of commerce and information along the ancient Silk Road. They also provided travelers the opportunity to exchange ideas and interact with people from different cultures. At the forum, it was agreed to establish a working group for elaboration of the Caravanserai Project which aims to simplify border crossings along the Silk Road. This working group would establish a project team which will carry out gaps and needs analysis and accordingly make suggestions and proposals for the realization of the Caravanserai Project. The project is gradually being put into practice.

Efforts to further the initiative are continuing. Also there are efforts to broaden the scope of the initiative to be not limited to countries on the historic Silk Road. Four more forums were organized in Tehran/Iran (2010), Batumi/Georgia (2011), Istanbul/Turkey (2012) and Gabala/Azerbaijan (2013).

6) East-West Energy Corridor

Turkey is geographically located in close proximity to more than 70% of the world's proven oil and gas reserves. Turkey, forming a natural energy bridge between the source countries, the Middle East and the Caspian basin, and consumer markets, stands as a key country in ensuring energy security through diversification of supply sources and routes, considerations that have gained increased significance in today's Europe.

In this respect, Turkey has been part of major pipeline projects, both realized and proposed, contributing to Turkey's role as a reliable transit country on the East-West as well as North-South energy axis.

Within this framework, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Crude Oil Pipeline the Azerbaijani oil and through the Iraq - Turkey (Kirkuk – Yumurtalık) Crude Oil Pipeline Iraqi oil is being transported to world markets. Also an important part of world's oil consumption is being transported through the Turkish Straights.

Furthermore, through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Natural Gas Pipeline, Turkey is acquiring Shah Deniz gas located in the Azerbaijan's part of Caspian Sea.

Turkey also has a big role in the venture called Southern Gas Corridor which aims the delivery of natural gas primarily from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to Europe. Yet Turkey, located between Europe and the source countries in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Middle East, is a transit country where pipelines will pass through its territory. Turkey-Greece Interconnector was built within the framework of the Southern Gas Corridor.

Additionally, Turkey is also a part of the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) project, a central part of the Southern Gas Corridor, which will connect the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey.

Turkey and Russia are also in negotiations for a natural gas pipeline known under the working name of Turkish Stream which aims to transport Russian gas to Europe via Turkey.

Turkey-China Relations

In the recent years, diplomatic relations between Turkey and China, which were established in 1971 with Turkey's recognition of the People's Republic of China, have improved significantly in the political, cultural and economic fields.

In 2010, it was announced that ties between China and Turkey had been raised to the level of strategic cooperative relationship. Additionally, Turkey was received as the Dialogue Partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held on June 2012.

On the occasion of 40th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, 2011 was celebrated both in Turkey and China. Furthermore, 2012 was the "Year of China in Turkey" and 2013 is the "Year of Turkey in China".

Currently, China is Turkey's third-largest trading partner, after Germany and Russia. Trade volume between Turkey and China has reached 27.8 (2.8 export to China– 24.9 import from China) billion dollars in 2014. Investment cooperation between both countries is improving and China is contributing to various infrastructure projects in

Turkey. Turkey's exports to China predominantly consist of raw materials and chemicals, which the Chinese economy is in need of. On the other hand, an important part of Turkey's imports from China consist of Investment goods and intermediate goods.

In 2010, Turkey and China signed an agreement where it was decided to build a roughly 7.000 km rail route, including high speed train projects, between Edirne and Kars as well as other major cities of Turkey as part of the Silk Road project. The project will be undertaken jointly by Turkish and Chinese companies and is expected to be completed by 2023. In 2012, after Chinese officials' visit, Turkey has decided on establishing an approximately 5.000 km of railway network, including high speed train projects, with Chinese companies.

Turkey is also a founding member of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which is established under the leadership of China in order to provide financial assistance for infrastructure projects in Asia within the framework of the Silk Road Project.

Recently, between the dates 28-30th of July, President Erdoğan, accompanied by a delegation comprising Turkish officials, visited China and met his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, and other Chinese officials including Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Among the issues reviewed in the meeting were political issues, economic relations, missile defense system, cultural cooperation and UNSC reform.

President Erdogan and President Xi Jinping stressed their aim of increasing bilateral trade volume to 100 billion US

Dollars. The state leaders oversaw the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Setting up a Cooperative Committee at the Level of Deputy Prime Ministers as well as several trade and investment agreements, including an Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investment and a Medium-Long Term Development Plan for Commercial Cooperation. They also discussed Silk Road Economic Belt project and announced that the Silk Road should be revived. President Xi invited Turkey to join the Silk Road projects offering to link it with Turkey's development strategy in pursuit of common prosperity.

Outlook for the future

There appears to be a gradual global shift of gravity of economical, commercial, political, military power from the West (USA + EU) to the Pacific. A new international-global order seems to be emerging in the horizon. From Turkey, this is perceived as the Emergence of Eurasia: a continent of interaction from the Atlantic to Pacific. Turkey finds itself no more as the traditional outpost of the West to the East or the backwaters of the West, but rather pivoting to the center of East and West, at the nexus of the two in the sphere of Eurasia. The Pacific for Turkey is not only the emerging giant China, but the Pacific Rim, including Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Southeast Asia as well.

This continental concept of Eurasia currently is broadened with the major agreement of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), involving major Pacific rim countries, but so far, not China. Whether this is going to create yet another big divide or will help further develop the Pacific rim remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether the Silk

Road project and the TPP will serve a mutual end for a win-win economic development or another manifestation of political rivalry. Turkey on its side will be following vigilantly all three projects, the TPP, the Silk Road as well as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) project which is bound to have a direct bearing on its economy.

South Korea's Political and Economic Relations with Iran under Park Geun-hye

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Keywords: South Korea, Middle East, Iran, Park Geun-hye, Lee Myung-bak

Abstract

Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Saudi Arabia, with an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2015 of US\$393.7 billion. It also has the second largest population of the region after Egypt, with an estimated 78.8 million people in 2015. Moreover, Iran ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves. In addition, Iranian authorities have adopted a comprehensive strategy encompassing market-based reforms as reflected in the government's 20-year vision document and the sixth five-year development plan

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for the 2016-2021 period. The plan includes three pillars, namely, the development of a resilient economy, progress in science and technology, and the promotion of cultural excellence. Against the background, no matter in theory or in reality, South Korea and Iran are absolutely ideal trade partner, given South Korea's 97% energy from overseas and its position as the 10th largest consumer of global energy and the fourth largest oil importer globally. However, it was not the case in the period of 2011-2015 due to the West's economic sanctions against Iran over its nuclear weapon development program.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore South Korea-Iran relations in the 21st Century with a particular focus on their bilateral political and economic interactions under Park Geun-hye. It starts with South Korea's relations with the Middle East in general, then a typical example of South Korea-Iran political and economic relations from President Lee Myung-bak to President Park Geun-hye in a comparative way, followed by a detailed analysis of South Korea's vibrant relations with Iran under Park Geun-hye, especially since her Iran visit in May 2016, finally prospects and challenges the bilateral relations in the future.

朴槿惠時代的南韓與伊朗政經關係

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韓國本土資源貧乏，重要的戰略物資必須依靠進口。而該國又是全球第十大能源消費國、第四大石油進口國。韓國能源 97% 依賴進口，尤其是石油更是百分之百依賴進口。韓國與穆斯林世界的關係發展及其「中東政策」的形成與 1970 年代初期朴正熙(Park Chung-hee)時代的經濟政策緊密相關，即朴正熙政權爲了因應 1973 年的石油危機與經濟發展，決定向中東產油國輸出勞力、承包基建工程以交換石油。這種工程承包和勞務輸出不但爲韓國進行大規模工業發展提供經驗和資本積累，而且也爲日後韓國深化和中東國家關係奠定深厚的經濟和人脈關係。2006 年石油佔韓國能源進口的 43%。¹因此，以出口爲導向的韓國一向就相當重視能源對其經濟的重要性。

進入 21 世紀以來，由於中印等新興經濟體經濟騰飛，對能源的需求激增，²使能源價格不斷攀升。而 2001 年 911 恐怖攻擊事件以及後來美國發動對伊拉克的戰爭進一步使能源價格飛漲，原油由 2000 年的 20 美元一桶激增至 2008

¹ <http://www.keia.org/Publications/Other/KangFINAL.pdf>

² Michael T. Klare, *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008. Reviewed by Richmond M Lloyd, *Naval War College Review*, Washington: Autumn 2008. Vol. 61, No. 4; p. 149.

年 3 月的 100 美元一桶。911 事件後的高油價以及擔心全球石油短缺越加加深中共的脆弱感，³因此北京當局自 2003 年起積極推動能源外交（尤其是在非洲與拉丁美洲）、氣候變遷所導致的國際節碳的壓力以及能源生產國紛紛國有化和加重外國公司的稅收等使能源出現前所未有的危機。東北亞與北美、歐洲並列為世界三大消費能源的區域，然而由於東北亞的地緣政治位置與明顯的能源缺乏的共通性與依賴海運易遭攔截與破壞的脆弱性，再加上在此區域裡並不存在任何區域的能源安全合作的機制，且各國合作的意願也不高，⁴因而使日益增加的能源需求成為該區域各國最重要的安全課題之一。⁵敏感的韓國李明博(Lee Myung-bak)政府自是越發重視能源安全，並積極推動能源外交，並將能源安全視為其外交核心，併入 2010 年 11 月在首爾舉行的 G20 高峰會的主要議題之一，達成其提昇國際地位，發揮國際領導的終極目標。

由於高油價持續，中東產油國經濟繁榮，因此對李明博時代南韓與中東關係所帶來影響整體而言是正面多於負面。雖然高油價對能源缺乏的韓國不利，但因中東產油國經濟呈現榮景，使南韓得以從這些國家獲得大型建設工程案的訂單與出售核能發電廠、武器等大宗項目來賺取外匯。所以，就算是 2009 年 12 月阿拉伯聯合大公國

³ Kreft, Heinrich, "China's Quest for Energy," *Policy Review*, 139 (Oct/Nov 2006): 65.

⁴ Jaewoo Choo, "Energy Cooperation Problems in Northeast Asia: Unfolding the Reality," *East Asia : An International Quarterly*, 23. 3 (Fall 2006): 91.

⁵ Hyun Choi, "Fueling Crisis or Cooperation? The Geopolitics of Energy Security in Northeast Asia," *Asian Affairs, an American Review*, 36. 1 (Spring 2009): 4.

(United Arab Emirates, 簡稱 UAE 或阿聯大公國) 杜拜 (Dubai) 爆發債務危機，但當時韓國建設業的良好前景並未受到衝擊，建設業仍被認為是 2010 年韓國國內投資的熱點。主要原因是因為韓國企業在杜拜並無重大專案工程。韓國大企業在中東地區的主要投資專案非房地產，而是建築器材出口。因此，不受到杜拜危機的直接影響。其次，中東地區不得不繼續向韓國建設業訂購建築器材。中東地區建設經濟調查機構 MEED 專案指出以沙烏地阿拉伯、阿聯大公國、科威特、阿曼、卡達、巴林等海灣合作委員會 (Gulf Cooperation Council, 簡稱 GCC) 的六國為中心，GCC 地區石油儲量高達 5000 億桶，占世界總儲量的 45%。中東地區 2010 年的建築器材訂單規模預估達 200.3 兆韓元。根據預算，韓國建設企業至少可接到 142.1 兆韓元的訂單。大宇證券分析員宋興毅指出如果油價持續高漲，與精油、天燃氣、石油化學等相關的建築器材訂單將會陸續增多。2009 年 12 月韓國鮮京工程建設(Sunkyong Engineering and Construction 或 SK E&C)贏得科威特國營石油公司(Kuwait Oil Company)價值 7.24 億美元的油管建設訂單，使得鮮京在該年度一共在 8 國獲得 10 件海外建設案，共計 48 億美元。⁶

不過，李明博時代南韓中東政策的最大負面因素是伊朗發展核武問題。南韓與伊朗在經貿上有很強的互補性，伊朗石油儲量約 1600 億桶，石油儲量占全球百分之十，為

⁶ “SK Engineering and Construction Wins Kuwait Pipeline Order,” *The Chosunilbo*, December 24, 2009, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2009/12/24/2009122400324.html

全球第四大原油蘊藏量國家。⁷由於西方制裁對伊朗實施經濟制裁，南韓陷入兩難，一面擔心參與西方制裁，韓流風潮和韓國產品在伊朗的銷售勢將受到衝擊，一面又面臨美國的壓力。伊朗威脅封鎖荷姆茲海峽 (Strait of Hormuz)，對周圍呼應美國要求的中東國家傳達強烈的警告。韓國最終被迫追隨美國對伊朗進行制裁，但獲美國諒解僅進行局部制裁，即少買伊朗石油而非中斷進口。伊朗對韓國參加美國國防授權法的伊朗制裁表示強烈不滿。所幸因為伊朗在韓國的銀行存放 5 兆韓元資金，兩國關係不致急劇惡化。韓國在 2010 年 10 月因為美國對伊制裁伊朗梅拉特銀行首爾分店停止營業後在企業銀行和友利銀行開設伊朗帳戶。當時美國希望韓國能自伊朗原油進口減半，而韓國相關經濟部門則考慮 30% 左右。⁸

當時伊朗為韓國第 4 大原油進口來源國，在中東地區為第 5 大貿易國，不得不考慮其在韓國經濟上所佔的地位，而為配合韓美同盟關係，與美、英、法等歐盟國家共同採取經濟制裁行動，即對伊朗制裁採取雙軌制，雖持續自伊朗進口原油，但限制進口部分石化產品，以降低對經濟發展之衝擊。當時韓國與伊朗年貿易額僅 3 億美元，一但禁止自伊朗進口石化產品，對韓國產業影響不致太大。

⁷ 「伊朗西部省分發現大型油田 頁岩油儲量達 20 億桶」，*聯合報*，2017 年 2 月 18 日，

https://udn.com/news/story/5/2293590?from=udn-ch1_breaknews-1-0-news

⁸ 「同盟關係和出口市場，兩個都不能放棄，政府暫時將持續戰略性模糊」，*東亞日報*，2012 年 1 月 19 日，

<http://chinese.donga.com/BIG/List/3/all/29/444523/1>

⁹2012 年下半年，制裁正式生效，韓國、日本和印度迫於壓力而大幅減少進口伊朗石油。英國諮詢公司經濟學人資訊社報告稱這 4 個亞洲國家幾乎購買伊朗 2012 年所有出口的石油，但在 2012 年前 11 個月裡，中國進口伊朗石油仍比前一年同期下降 23%，韓國和日本從伊朗進口的石油則縮減約 40%。¹⁰

然而當 2013 年 2 月朴槿惠（Park Geun-hye）繼任南韓總統時，全球能源情況已丕變。最大變數就是美國「水力壓裂」頁岩氣（Shale Gas）開採技術的成功，因而得以取得低廉原油與天然氣體稱為頁岩油（Shale Oil）與頁岩氣。¹¹此一革命不僅使美國由原本的每天進口 900 萬桶石油的世界最大石油進口國一躍成為超越俄羅斯的全球最大原油與天然氣生產國，造成全球能源版圖的巨大位移，¹²美國也因而成為世界能源的擁有者和引領者，驅動能源產業出現一場革命。頁岩氣革命的成功不僅打亂了全球能源的格局，也導致國際原油價格因生產過剩而油價難再飆升。

⁹ 「韓國採雙軌制配合美國加重經濟制裁伊朗行動」，國際貿易局，2011 年 12 月 12 日，

<http://twbusiness.nat.gov.tw/news.do?id=142475267>

¹⁰ 「美歐卡死石油貿易 伊朗經濟痛苦掙扎」，*中國青年報*，2013 年 1 月 14 日，http://zqb.cyol.com/html/2013-01/14/nw.D110000zgqnb_20130114_1-04.htm

¹¹ 氫化、熱解後可提煉出液態烴類，由此開採出來的類原油與天然氣體稱為「頁岩油」、「頁岩氣」。「美國頁岩風改變世界能源版圖」，*新華網*，

<http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/www.xinhuanet.com/energy/zt/rht/06.htm>

¹² 「美國超越俄羅斯 成為全球最大原油與天然氣生產國」，*今日新聞*，2015 年 6 月 10 日，

<http://www.nownews.com/n/2015/06/10/1715852>

結果，南韓與中東國家關係裡長期以來都是正面因素的沙烏地阿拉伯因素（南韓最重要的海外建設市場來源）轉為負面因素（訂單無法履行或縮水），而伊朗則因西方國家與伊朗達成協議，宣布解除制裁，由負面因素（李明博政府為配合美國而不得不減少進口伊朗石油，凍結與伊朗的經貿投資活動）轉為正面因素（朴槿惠政府視伊朗為「中東最後藍海」，至盼在中東能找到解決南韓經濟困境與痛苦的良方）。

2015 年 7 月伊朗與世界 6 強國就核問題達成協議，該協議在 2016 年 1 月生效後，美國、歐盟和聯合國共同解除國際社會對伊朗的經濟制裁，伊朗遂致力於大幅擴充能源、交通等基礎設施和煉油、鋼鐵等產業設施的發展，以求重建國內經濟。伊朗的經濟規模在中東地區排名第二。經濟制裁解除後，預計伊朗 2016 年和今年的經濟增長率分別可達 5.8%與 6.7%，將會表現出高速的經濟增長趨勢。¹³ 根據大韓貿易投資振興公社（KOTRA）從 2015 年 12 月 20 日至 2016 年 1 月 14 日，對有關汽車及零件、家電、醫療電器、石油化學等領域的 521 家伊朗進口商進行調查。54%的伊朗進口商表示解除制裁後與韓國企業的交易量將擴大至目前交易量的 5%左右。44%的伊朗進口商表示伊朗解除制裁後計劃與韓國企業的交易規模擴大到 20%。調查還顯示解除制裁後伊朗進口商最願意進行交易國是歐盟國家，共有 221 家伊朗進口商選擇與歐盟交易。緊隨其後的是中國，共有 166 家伊朗進口商選擇了中國。此外，有 81

¹³ 「韩伊建交 54 年韩国总统首次访问伊朗」，*韩民族日報*，2016 年 4 月 28 日，<http://china.hani.co.kr/arti/international/862.html>

家伊朗進口商選擇韓國、32 家伊朗進口商選擇日本、15 家伊朗進口商選擇土耳其。¹⁴

根據世界銀行，伊朗的經濟規模在中東與北非地區（Middle East and North Africa，簡稱 MENA）排名第二（僅次於沙烏地阿拉伯），其 2015 年 GDP 為 3,937 億美元，2016 年個人平均所得約為 5,998 美元。伊朗的人口在此地區亦僅次於埃及，擁有 7,880 萬人口，¹⁵在此當前全球經濟遲滯之際，堪稱是個極為誘人的新興市場。因此，世界各國領導人都爭相拉攏與造訪伊朗以圖攫取商機。除朴槿惠外，2016 年 1 月習近平訪問伊朗，其後 5 月日本首相安倍晉三與印度總理莫迪先後訪問德黑蘭。

伊朗的基礎建設整體架構俱全，道路系統四通八達，全長約 199,000 公里。伊朗境內的高速公路及公路多數鋪有柏油路面，狀況良好。主要城市均建有地鐵系統，城市之間則通過 10,000 多公里的鐵路連接。然而，由於受到國際制裁，伊朗經濟多年來一直被西方國家孤立於全球貿易及金融體系之外，多年來投資不足，導致國內運輸及公用設施領域呈現陳舊老化的狀況，其中以公共交通系統問題最為嚴重。自 1979 年伊斯蘭革命以後，伊朗斷絕與美國的外交關係，此後開始開發核武器，這讓其與西方國家的關係迅速惡化。2000 年美國小布希政府將伊朗定為「邪惡軸心國」，2007 年甚至下達金融制裁措施。歐巴馬政府也在 2011 年對伊朗中央銀行開始實施制裁措施，2012 年還阻止與伊朗國家石油公司(NIOC)進行貿易。因此，不僅是道路

¹⁴ 「西方解除對伊朗制裁與韓國經貿關係有望擴大」，*亞洲經濟*，2016 年 1 月 17 日，<http://china.ajunews.com/view/20160117135636230>

¹⁵ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iran/overview>

和港灣等基本基礎設施陳舊且缺乏。

因此，伊朗在去年 1 月解除經濟制裁後擬將大規模釋放之石油外匯，用於重建國家，尤其是基建產業大有改善空間，極需吸納外商直接投資及新技術以改善國內逐漸老化的運輸系統及公用設施。當地交通設施無力應付城鎮地區日益增長的汽車數量。每天繁忙時段，德黑蘭必定會出現交通阻塞，市內道路每每堵塞數小時之久。由於技術落後，公用基礎設施同樣效率欠佳。世界經濟論壇公佈的《2015-2016 年全球競爭力報告》顯示，在整體基礎設施質素方面，伊朗在 140 個經濟體中排名第 76 位，遠落後於第二位的阿聯大公國及第 31 位的沙烏地阿拉伯。

為擴展及提升現有設施和運作系統，伊朗政府正著手處理投資不足的問題。據 Frost & Sullivan 預測，未來 10 年伊朗將在交通基建領域(包括鐵路、道路、航空、海運及海港)創造約值 2,500 億至 3,000 億美元的投資機遇，在發電、供水及廢水處理等範疇出現 1,200 億至 1,500 億美元的資金需求。為滿足龐大的基建資金需求，伊朗政府現正推行建設－擁有一經營(Build-Own-Operate, 簡稱 BOO)、建設－經營－轉讓(Build-Operate-Transfer, 簡稱 BOT)和公私合作制(Public-Private-Partnership, 簡稱 PPP)等多種專案模式吸引外商直接投資，同時鼓勵當地企業與外國公司成立合資企業。例如，就能源產業而言，伊朗已與土耳其能源企業 Unit International 簽訂價值 42 億美元的合同，雙方計畫在 20 年內，採用 BOT 模式興建 7 所天然氣發電廠，總裝機量達 6,020 兆瓦。¹⁶

¹⁶ 「伊朗基建行業機遇香港經貿局」，2016 年 10 月 24 日，
<http://www.gulfinfo.cn/info/show-6936.shtml>

而在去年初國際制裁解禁以來，由於伊朗的基礎建設及相關對外採購案正激增，且該國又被南韓視為「中東最後一片藍海」，為南韓廠商提供龐大的商機，開闢新的海外市場，去年 5 月韓國總統朴槿惠即率領 236 家包括三星、現代等大企業韓商代表訪問伊朗，是韓國史上最大的商務代表團。會見該國總統魯哈尼（Hassan Rouhani），這是韓國 1962 年與伊朗建交以來兩國總統的首次會晤。在高峰會上宣布將雙邊貿易量擴大 3 倍至 180 億美元，¹⁷並與伊朗簽訂 456 億美元規模的諒解備忘錄（MOU）。同時，南韓亦盼望在中東能找到解決經濟痛苦的良方。¹⁸

除造船、建設、能源、社會生產基礎設施等大規模事業外，為幫助伊朗企業履行合同、透明伊朗銷售產品以及進行技術轉移等，伊朗政府鼓勵韓國企業到伊朗設立分公司。按照伊朗政府的要求，基礎設施和成套設備訂單總量的 90% 左右需要韓國企業訂立金融籌備計畫。而韓國政府為加強對韓商進軍伊朗的稅政支援。韓國國稅廳廳長林煥守與伊朗國稅廳廳長 Taghavi Nejad 在德黑蘭舉行兩國首次國稅廳廳長會議。林煥守成為韓國首位訪問伊朗國稅廳的國稅廳廳長。國稅廳表示自從自 2016 年 1 月結束對伊朗的經濟制裁以及 5 月兩國舉行首腦會談以來，韓國企業進軍當地的趨勢越加明顯，韓國政府決定有必要在稅政上擴大支援。

實際上在美國對伊朗實施經濟制裁之前，早在 2011 年

¹⁷ “Iran, South Korea to begin trade in euros Korea Imports More Iranian Oil,” *The Korea Herald*, “August 26, 2016, <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160826000857>

¹⁸ “Can South Korea Capitalize on a Second Middle East Boom?” August 25, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/can-south-korea-capitalize-on-a-second-middle-east-boom/>

伊朗便已是韓國的 6 大主要貿易交往國之一，貿易規模一度達到 174 億美元。但在實施經濟制裁後，2015 年年末便驟降到 61 億美元，去年回升至 83 億美元以上，因此兩國國稅廳加強合作迫在眉睫。且伊朗政府的稅收行政改革迄今未見成效，儘管 2009 年韓國、伊朗已簽訂稅收協定，卻因雙重徵稅等問題難以解決，使進軍當地的韓商頗感不便。林煥守提議簽訂兩國國稅廳相互合作協定，俾利擴大對韓國企業的稅政支援，促進兩國政府間持續交流。若得以簽署該協定將成為韓國與中東國家國稅廳所簽訂的首個相互合作協定。確保與包括伊朗在內的中東地區的交流管道，意義非凡。同時，韓國政府也承諾將助伊朗進行稅收行政改革，並提供伊朗國稅廳職員有關納稅資訊化系統 (NTIS)、增值稅、所得稅等韓國國稅行政體制教育。¹⁹

為順利進軍伊朗，韓國企業亦亟需融資。對此，韓國國策金融機關表示積極支持的意願。貿易保險公司原計畫提供 18 億歐元融資，但基於伊朗要求，向上調整為 45 億歐元。此外，尚有進出口銀行 (Korea Exim Bank) 的 130 億歐元援助等，實際金融支援金額共計達 220 億歐元。據悉已由對伊韓幣遠期信用狀賣斷 (forfaiting) 系統實施，²⁰ 去

¹⁹ 「韓國擴大對進軍伊朗韓企的稅政支援」，*每日經濟*，2017 年 2 月 18 日，<http://china.mk.co.kr/china/view.php?category=20002002&year=2017&idx=17466>

²⁰ 對出口商(賣方)而言，增進國際競爭力端視於是否能爭取較佳的融資條件及風險控管能力之良窳。遠期信用狀賣斷(Forfaiting)不僅可協助資本額不足的中小企業以遠期信用狀付款方式拓展外銷市場，且若輸出產品為金額大、付款期間長的資本財時，更可在開狀行承兌後賣斷，即時取得資金融通。同時轉嫁國家、經濟與開狀行信用風險給買斷行，俾利出口商在風險獲得控制下以最小的銀行額度創造最大的收益。Forfaiting 堪稱是提升出口競爭力的利器，可協助規避國際貿易中的交易風險；進口商的購買力亦可隨之改善，更可有節省財務成本之效果。<https://www.esunbank.com.tw/about/708.essay>

年 4 月韓國進出口銀行與友利銀行即已實施 60 億韓元規模的首次貿易結算。遠期信用狀賣斷是指即使進口企業在接收到貨物之後沒有支付貨款，金融公司以不向出口企業申請償還貨款為條件買入有關貨款交易的信用證。如此運作是在伊朗經濟制裁解除後尚不能使用美元或歐元進行貿易結算期間的權宜之計(因韓幣屬區域貨幣，無法作為貿易交易手段)。因此伊朗中央銀行通過在韓國友利銀行與企業銀行寄存的貿易貨款實現對伊朗的進出口貿易。而有關伊朗當地銀行信用證的買入，只有友利銀行與企業銀行可以實行。因無法親自實施福費廷，因此韓國進出口銀行將通過間接購入方式「第二次 **Forfaiting**」來支援韓國企業的對伊出口。藉著此一方式，起亞汽車等韓國汽車業的汽車零配件出口、愛茉莉太平洋 (**Amore Pacific**) 等化妝品公司的彩妝等人氣產品的出口都因此得以更加活性化。伊朗經濟制裁解除後，與伊朗進行進出口交易的韓國企業可經由伊朗中央銀行在韓國友利銀行與企業銀行的韓幣清算帳戶來完成即期信用狀 (**at sight Letter of Credit**) 貨款結算。但為發掘正式的伊朗進口通路，有必要啟動進口方面所偏好的最長期限的遠期信用狀(**Usance Credit**)為 6 個月的信用狀交易。但問題是進口方不履行支付的風險。進口企業如果不支付貨款，購買信用證的友利銀行將遭受損失。而如果韓國進出口銀行經由購買信用證的 **Forfaiting** 方式承擔風險，那麼此問題就不再是個阻礙韓國企業從伊朗進口的障礙。²¹韓國天然氣公社、韓國電力等也正在推行以兆為單位的專案。

²¹ 「貿易金融插翅騰飛，伊朗出口之路豁然開朗」，*每日經濟*，2016 年 4 月 4 日，
<http://china.mk.co.kr/china/view.php?category=20002002&year=2016&idx=14769>

另外，2017 年 3 月韓國第三大企業集團鮮京集團(SK Group) 的 SK 建設在伊朗拿下總工程費高達 4 兆多韓元規模的燃氣複合火力民資發電站建設工程訂單。SK 建設成？首家進軍伊朗民資發電事業的韓國建築公司。此一工程是建設和運營 5 座總 5000MW 容量的燃氣複合火力發電站的項目，是伊朗發電事業中歷屆規模最大的一次。建設與金融費用等總計 34 億歐元(約 4.1 兆韓元)，僅工程費用就高達 25 億歐元(約 3.25 兆韓元)。明年 1 月 SK 建設公司在薩韋、紮黑丹兩處的 1200MW 和 880MW 規模的燃氣複合火力發電站將開工。工程時間約 2 年半，目標是在 2020 年下半年(7~12 月)實現發電站的商業運營。SK 建設在蘇菲安、誇斯裏西裏、阿瓦士 3 處也將依次開始施工。SK 建設在發電站竣工後將擁有 30%的股份，並與比利時能源企業 UNIT 集團一起共同運營發電站。²²

伊朗是個天然資源豐富的國家，天然氣和原油儲量分別位居世界第二位和第四位。而且，伊朗位於中東和中亞七國之間，此一地理位置有利於其成為出口前哨基地。然而伊朗雖為石油富國，但因缺乏煉油設施，一直在進口汽油等石油產品。在西方制裁解除後伊朗對基礎設施建設和煉油造船產業等韓國企業擁有優勢的領域需求較大。因此，韓商對中東的商機充滿期待，認為是對深受經濟不景氣困擾的韓國建築、造船和重工業界吹來一股暖風。²³今年

²² 「伊朗淘金潮，SK 建設承攬 4 萬億韓元規模的民資發電站建設工程項目訂單」，*東亞日報*，2017 年 3 月 20 日，
<http://chinese.donga.com/BIG/List/3/02/29/875762/1>

²³ 「大林產業獲伊朗逾 2 萬億韓元天價訂單」，*韓國中央日報中文網*，2016 年 12 月 30 日，
http://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.do?method=detail&art_id=161530

3月現代工程和建設(Hyundai Engineering & Construction)在伊朗與伊朗國家石油公司(NIOC)的子公司 AHDAF 簽訂《伊朗南帕爾斯(South Pars)12 第二階段擴張工程》正式合同，工程造價高達 30.9 億歐元(3.8 兆韓元)規模的石油化學成套設備工程，是韓國建築公司在伊朗承攬的工程中規模最大者。工地在位於德黑蘭以南約 1100 公尺遠的 Tonbak 地區的南帕爾斯天然氣田上。該專案將藉借工程費給招標處以收回利息的施工單位金融仲介 (Engineering, Procurement, Construction and Financing, 簡稱 EPCF) 方式進行。韓國進出口銀行和韓國貿易保險公社爲了 EPCF 大力提供積極支援，把工程費的 85% 首先借給招標處。²⁴此外，現代工程亦圖爭取贊詹 (Zanjan) 和 Neyzar 地區的天然氣發電站建設工程。

再者，現代建設等韓國 6 家建築公司在共計 2.2 兆韓元規模的醫院建設事業中也取得優先協商者的地位。²⁵首爾大學 (SNU) Bundang 醫院與大林實業 (Daelim Industrial Company) 聯手參與伊朗西北部的 Tabriz 大學醫院的興建工程，未來完工後將有 800 床位。這是 2016 年 5 月朴槿惠總統伊朗行的承諾，即韓國健康福利部 (Ministry of Health and Welfare)、韓國進出口銀行與伊朗健康醫學部共同融資價值 17 億美元在伊朗境內建六家醫院，這家醫院是其中之

²⁴ 「現代工程在伊朗承攬 3.8 萬億韓元規模的超大型石油化學成套設備建設工程」，*東亞日報*，2017 年 3 月 14 日，
<http://chinese.donga.com/List/3/02/28/871019/1>

²⁵ 「韓國-伊朗間的貿易，下周起可用歐元進行結算……有利、新韓、韓亞三家銀行負責主辦」，*每日經濟*，2016 年 8 月 26 日，
<http://china.mk.co.kr/china/view.php?category=20002002&year=2016&idx=15991>

一。²⁶而且，大林實業已確定得標的是 19 億美元的水力發電工程(Bakhtiari hydroelectric project)以及逾 2 兆韓元的伊斯法罕(Isfahan) 石油煉油公司 (EORC)煉油廠的升級案訂單。這是韓國建築公司獲得的規模最大的伊朗工程訂單。此次工程是在伊斯法罕地區動工的通過增修煉油工廠設備來生產高附加價值產品的項目。伊斯法罕地區位於伊朗首都德黑蘭南部，距德黑蘭有 400 多公里。大林產業將負責從工程設計到購買器材、施工和金融調度等整個過程。大林產業稱公司可以單獨拿下此工程得益於長期積累的信任。大林產業是首家在伊朗開始海外建設項目的韓國企業。大林產業自 1975 年 5 月開始，在伊朗伊斯法罕建設軍用設施土木工程，之後在過去 40 多年間負責 26 項、總計 45.5 億美元規模的工程。²⁷

大林產業也爭取其他重大工程的訂單如價值 53 億美元的伊斯法罕(Isfahan)-阿瓦士(Ahvaz)鐵路工程案。和鐵路項目等項目發展全國鐵路網是伊朗政府基礎設施建造計畫的首要事項之一。伊朗政府擬向鐵路網投入約 250 億美元，未來將興建德黑蘭－伊斯法罕高速鐵路及實現德黑蘭－馬什哈德(Mashhad)鐵路的電氣化改造，最終目標為於 2025 年之前將全國鐵路總長度延長一倍以上至 25,000 公里。現代建設也力圖獲得價值 17 億美元的 Chabahar 至 Zahedan

²⁶ “SNU Bundang Hospital to Participate in Iran's Tabriz Hospital Building Project,” *The Korea Economic Daily*, July 6, 2016, *The Korea Economic Daily*

<http://english.hankyung.com/news/apps/news.view?popup=0&nid=0&c1=04&newscate=1&nkey=201607061215591>

²⁷ 「大林產業獲伊朗逾 2 萬億韓元天價訂單」，*韓國中央日報中文網*，2016 年 12 月 30 日，

http://chinese.joins.com/big5/article.do?method=detail&art_id=161530

鐵路工程案、價值 30 億美元的 Bid Boland 第二階段的天然氣精鍊廠。大宇與現代集團也參與價值 10 億美元的興建德黑蘭到索邦(Shomal)高速公路、價值 20 億美元的煉油廠等工程案的競標。²⁸另一引起國際供應商關注的專案是德黑蘭地鐵網路擴展工程。目前德黑蘭的地鐵系統共有 5 條營運路線，分別是 1、2、3、4 及 5 號線，其中 3 號線僅部分完工及通車；整個地鐵系統包括約 100 個地鐵站。目前 6 號線和 7 號線正在施工，而 1 號線也正進行延伸工程，未來將接駁伊瑪目何梅尼(Imam Khomeini)國際機場。預計至 2017 年年底，地鐵路線總長度將增加共 100 公里。隨著貿易限制逐步放寬，國際採購變得更為方便，預計德黑蘭、馬什哈德(Mashhad)、設拉子及伊斯法罕等大城市的地鐵網路發展將導致對地鐵列車的需求激增。伊朗工業部長表示該國將於 2025 年之前為至少 4,000 列地鐵列車進行招標。

此外，伊朗政府亦計畫改善航空基礎設施，未來 3 至 5 年內新增多達 500 架飛機。目前伊朗共有超過 60 個機場。伊朗道路及城市發展部轄下國有企業伊朗機場集團(Iran Airports Holding Company)計畫於國內進行大規模機場開發項目。例如，伊朗主要國際航空樞紐德黑蘭伊瑪目何梅尼國際機場將興建價值 28 億美元的新客運大樓，使機場客運能力由目前的每年 600 萬名旅客提高至 2,000 萬名旅客。此外，德黑蘭還有另一個規模較小的梅赫拉巴德(Mehrabad)國際機場。雖然德黑蘭伊瑪目霍梅尼國際機場已接手大部分國際航班，但梅赫拉巴德國際機場仍是伊

²⁸ “Government's Exaggerated Claims of Business Diplomacy in Iran Revealed to Be Worthless,” *The Korea Economic Daily*, December 9, 2016, <http://english.hankyung.com/news/apps/news.view?popup=0&nid=0&c1=04&newscate=1&nkey=201612090734391>

朗最繁忙的機場。伊朗第二大及第三大城市馬什哈德及伊斯法罕亦計畫進行機場現代化改造及擴建工程，而阿瓦士和布希爾則會興建新機場。2015 年 11 月伊朗機場集團透露，2016 年僅機場基建方面便可提供約值 30 億美元的投資機遇，反映這一領域發展快速，商業潛力巨大。

再者，目前伊朗境內多個港口正進行基礎設施發展工程，包括位於阿巴斯(Abbas)的沙希德拉賈伊港(Shahid Rajaie Port)第三期擴建工程及位於恰赫巴哈爾(Chabahar)和布希爾 Negin Island 的新碼頭工程。位於伊朗東南部阿曼灣沿岸的恰赫巴哈爾港口，被視為通往阿富汗及其他中亞國家的另一門戶，因此備受國際投資者青睞。在港口管理方面，韓國已承諾將與伊朗合作。韓國船級社(Korean Register of Shipping)早前與伊朗船級社(Classification Society)簽署諒解備忘錄，雙方將成立一家名為伊朗－韓國技術保險公司(Iran-Korea Technology Assurance Company)的合資企業。合資企業由雙方各占 50%股份，日後將在德黑蘭提供工廠設施認證和工程服務，計畫 2017 年全面投入營運。另外，據報現代重工(Hyundai Heavy Industries)和 SPP Shipbuilding 正就船舶訂單與伊朗多家船東公司磋商。

目前韓國與伊朗兩國造船業已簽訂 3 兆韓元左右的諒解備忘錄，據參與談判的人士稱伊朗國有航運公司與韓國船廠現代重工業股份有限公司就價值 6.5 億美元集裝箱船和油輪訂單的談判已進入深入階段，這意味著伊朗航運巨頭在十年後重返國際市場。若上述交易成交，將是伊朗伊斯蘭共和國航運公司(Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines)和石油生產商 Iranian Offshore Oil Co.船隊現代化計畫的一部分，該計畫總計支出 25 億美元。Iranian Offshore Oil Co.

是國有石油公司伊朗國家石油公司(National Iranian Oil Co.)旗下子公司。現代重工業發言人表示伊斯蘭共和國航運公司正在與該公司就一筆 10 艘船隻的訂單進行洽談。²⁹六天後即傳來捷報，現代重工業從伊朗國營海運公司 IRISL 確定拿到價值 7 億美元的十艘船舶訂單。

大宇造船海洋也已與伊朗工業發展與革新組織(IDRO)簽訂基本協議書，協議書的內容為對造船廠開發項目互相進行合作和支援。IDRO 是伊朗的產業礦物通商部的下屬機構，主管伊朗的國家核心產業——汽車和造船等項目。此次協議書規定，雙方將對當地造船廠開發和運營所需的所有事項進行合作。大宇造船海洋相關人士表示伊朗政府期盼大宇造船對正在計劃中的當地造船廠建設傳授技術和造船廠運營技巧，進行器材調配等。該公司盼能藉此次協議進駐伊朗造船海運市場。

解決國內缺水問題是伊朗政府的當務之急。伊朗的水利基礎設施效率低下，導致供水問題持續多時，截至 2016 年 4 月伊朗全國共有 450 個城市受缺水問題影響。伊朗能源部長表示國內現有 160 座大壩投入運作，另有 90 座大壩正在興建中。單是在水利方面，伊朗已擬定目標於 2021 年之前吸納 120 億美元投資，用於供水及廢水處理項目。除興建水壩外，政府亦加大力度支持建設更優質的廢水排放網路，特別是在農業和工業領域建立廢水迴圈利用系統。在此背景下，伊朗與韓國水資源公社(K-water)和大林實業訂立有關供水管理和廢水處理解決方案的協議。此外，韓國斗山重工與建設(Doosan Heavy Industries and

²⁹ 「伊朗航運公司接近與韓國船廠簽訂 6.5 億美元訂單」，*華爾街日報*，2016 年 12 月 6 日，<http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20161206/biz095742.asp>

Construction) 刻正在伊朗進行價值 1.87 億美元的海水淡化廠(desalination plant)工程。³⁰

從更廣的範圍來看，朴槿惠的伊朗之行反映了朴槿惠政權在 2013 年推出的「中等強權」外交（middle power diplomacy）戰略。根據這一戰略，韓國需要強化與中等強國的外交關係，以便在國際問題上相互協調立場。根據這一戰略，自 2013 年 9 月以來，韓國便積極推進同墨西哥、印尼、土耳其和澳大利亞的雙邊關係並進而形成五國外長（MIKTA）協商機制。³¹朴槿惠的伊朗行突顯韓國在中東繼續深化和擴大「中等強國」的外交戰略雄心。尤其是在周邊大國、強權盟國都無法撼動北韓核武計劃之後，「中等強國」戰略向伊朗的延伸則成了韓國的不二選擇。如果將與北韓有直接軍事技術交流的伊朗納入 MIKTA 協商機構，則北韓的軍事交流、外匯獲取以及其他對外活動空間將遭受極大的擠壓。對歷經西方大國制裁和恐嚇的伊朗來說，加入此一「中等強國」協商機制則有利於拓展其外交空間和深化其經貿活動。如果伊朗加入此一中等強國協商機制，則 MIKTA 就可以從東南亞的印尼延伸至西亞的伊朗和

³⁰ Can South Korea Capitalize on a Second Middle East Boom? August 25, 2016 <http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/can-south-korea-capitalize-on-a-second-middle-east-boom/>

³¹ The MIKTA countries are significant economic powers and play pivotal strategic roles in our regions. MIKTA countries are the 11th, 13th, 15th, 16th and 18th largest economies in the world. We share important fundamental values and interests, including a commitment to open economies, human rights and democracy, and it matters to us all that international governance structures effectively address the problems we face. “MIKTA – Mexico, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Turkey, Australia,” <http://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/international-organisations/mikta/Pages/mikta.aspx>

土耳其。伊朗核協議的簽署和落實基本掃除韓國在中東的「中等強國」戰略障礙。

從長遠來看，影響韓國與回教世界關係的因素主要有兩個，一是美國因素；二是韓國內部的宗教關係。美國-伊朗關係的迅速改善使得韓國的中東外交更加獨立、積極；作為東亞的民主國家，韓國的宗教關係不但融洽，且堪稱表率。事實上，韓國的回教徒在韓國發展與中東另一中等強國——土耳其的關係中發揮了獨特作用。縱觀東西，韓國在伊斯蘭世界中的「中等強國戰略」已取得可觀的成就，如和印尼在潛艇、新型飛機等重大國防工業上的合作；韓國和土耳其在核電方面的合作；以此合作模式類推，不排除韓國和伊朗在軍工和核電方面的合作。有意思的是，韓國的「中等強國」戰略很顯然更符合回教世界主要國家的現狀和需求。穆斯林世界缺乏一個超級政治、軍事、和經濟代表，而更多的是中等強國如印尼、土耳其和伊朗。從某種意義上來說，韓國的「中等強國」外交戰略對回教國家有很強的針對性，而回教國家和韓國的此一外交戰略則有天然的契合性。韓國「中等強國」尤其適合主要穆斯林國家還在於中等強國可以真正摒棄大國的文化傲慢，這在伊斯蘭世界尤其重要。韓國日益深化同包括伊朗、印尼和土耳其等回教世界中等強國的關係必然會影響西亞和東亞政治、經濟和文化交流結構。³²其實，伊朗與北韓的關係一直不錯。在未來未嘗不可為朝鮮半島問題另闢解決之道。

³² 「馬海云：韓國中等強國」戰略在中東的推進」，*壹讀*，2016年5月4日，<https://read01.com/GJej6x.html>

據大韓貿易投資振興公社(KOTRA)中東亞洲 CIS 組長金明熙表示伊朗是中東國家 GDP 排名第 2 (僅次於沙烏地阿拉伯的第二大經濟體)、人口數達 8,000 萬人之大國,乃中東地區第二人口大國,僅次於埃及。若韓國與伊朗間交流日益擴大,將對韓國整體產業帶來正面影響。³³是後,雙邊直航及海運路線重啓。2015 年南韓與伊朗雙邊貿易額約 61 億美元(2015 年臺灣與伊朗雙邊貿易額約為 9.7 億美元),2011 年雙邊貿易額曾高達 174 億美元。³⁴石油是韓國自伊朗與進口的項目,2016 年前九個月,韓國自伊朗進口石油激增,在韓國進口石油總額中已佔近 10 %,韓國自伊朗進口石油 7,800 桶,比前一年同期增加 131.9%。在 2011 年西方國家對伊朗進行經濟制裁之前,韓國自伊朗進口石油平均一年約 8,718 桶,但至 2014 年已降至 4,492 桶。³⁵另一方面,在德黑蘭的要求下,伊朗與韓國決定從去年 8 月底開始用歐元結算雙邊貿易,此舉是為了以合法方式繞過美國對伊朗的制裁,將不再有任何美元干預。

結論

至於未來,韓國與伊朗經貿的挑戰有二,一是中國,根據大韓貿易投資振興公社(KOTRA)下屬的北京貿易館

³³ http://www.dois.moea.gov.tw/doesbin/qd_fdr.exe?STARTPRO=../bin/news.pro&template=display&flag=main&num_DATA_SINGLE=1050510171712

³⁴ 「南韓於首爾設立商務中心,推廣與伊朗雙邊貿易及投資」,2016 年 8 月 10 日,
<http://info.taiwantrade.com/CH/bizsearchdetail/8312123/C>

³⁵ “Korea Imports More Iranian Oil,” *Digital Chosun*, November 7, 2016,
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/11/07/2016110701339.html

報告，韓國對伊朗貿易競爭力上大幅落後於中國。該報告指出韓國在對伊朗出口方面和中國大陸有著無法避免的競爭關係，但由於中國製品在價格上擁有優勢，再加上中國與伊朗兩國已簽署「一帶一路合作備忘錄」，韓國在促進對伊朗貿易上與中國相較堪稱瞠乎其後。韓國和中國在對伊朗出口的主要的競爭品目是機械、電子和移動通訊等產品。KOTRA 報告指出中國對伊朗貿易規模在未來 10 年間將擴大至每年 6000 億美元。另外，中國和伊朗史上最大規模的基建項目「德黑蘭-馬什哈德鐵路電氣化改造計畫」已在去年 2 月開工，該項目是由中國機械進出口有限公司（中機公司）和蘇電集團與伊朗基礎設施工程集團 MAPNA 合作承建，規模高達 21 億美元，而其中的 85% 由中國提供貸款融資。隨著國際社會宣佈解除對伊朗相關經濟和金融制裁後，由於伊朗是個極有市場潛力的中東國家，許多國家紛紛擴大對伊朗投資建設，韓國在對伊朗市場上大幅落後於中國，並指韓國需要和韓國國內企業緊密合作，及早就開發伊朗市場作出應對。³⁶

早在 2010 年中國即已取代歐盟成為伊朗最大的交易夥伴。當時官方統計資料顯示，歐盟是伊朗最大的交易夥伴，雙邊貿易額達 350 億美元。伊朗與中國的貿易金額則是 290 億美元。但這些數位並未忠實反映真相，伊朗與阿聯酋的雙邊貿易，許多來自中國或銷往中國。伊朗與阿聯酋 150 億美元的貿易商品，半數以上是轉運到中國或來自中國。如果將這個因素考慮進去，中國與伊朗的貿易金額至少有 365 億美元，這可能比整個歐盟加起來還多。據伊

³⁶ 「韓國貿易公社：韓國對伊貿易競爭力落後於中國」，*亞洲經濟*，2016 年 2 月 22 日，
<http://china.ajunews.com/view/20160222080232594>

朗-中國商會稱中國 11%的能源必須依賴伊朗。伊朗從中國主要進口消費商品及機器，伊朗則出口石油、天然氣及石化產品到中國。³⁷

據伊朗財經論壇報，伊朗海關資料顯示，2016 年 3 月 21 日以來，前 8 個月，伊朗非石油貿易額為 555 億美元。其中進口 2156 萬噸貨物，價值 273.8 億美元，同比增長 0.94%；出口 8176 萬噸貨物，價值 281.1 億美元，同比增長 5.74%。中國大陸是進口伊朗貨物的主要國家。前 8 個月，伊朗向中國出口貨物價值 51.1 億美元，同比增長 1.82%。其他主要出口目的地包括阿拉伯聯合大公國（43.7 億美元）、伊拉克（46.9 億美元）、土耳其（26 億美元）、韓國（21.4 億美元）。其中，對韓國出口比 2015 年同期增長 708%。伊朗主要進口來源地包括中國（64.7 億美元）、阿拉伯聯合大公國（46.7 億美元）、韓國（21.4 億美元）、土耳其（17.6 億美元）、德國（14.6 億美元）。來自中國、阿拉伯聯合大公國、韓國、土耳其的進口分別比 2015 年同期降低 4.82%、10.91%、12.38% 和 14.23%，而自德國進口同比增長 25.21%。2015 年伊朗非石油外貿總額為 813.8 億美元，進口額 401.3 億美元，比上年降低 22.77%。主要進口來源地為中國、阿聯酋、韓國、土耳其和瑞士。出口額 412.4 億美元，比上年同期下降 16.3%。中國、伊拉克、阿拉伯聯合大公國、阿富汗和印度是主要出口目的地國家。³⁸

³⁷ 「英媒稱中國已取代歐盟成為伊朗最大交易夥伴」，環球時報-環球網，2010 年 2 月 9 日，
<http://news.163.com/10/0209/10/5V2U5K980001121M.html>

³⁸ 「中國繼續保持伊朗第一大交易夥伴地位」，搜狐網，2016 年 11 月 29 日，<http://mt.sohu.com/20161129/n474385832.shtml>

而美國川普（Donald Trump）政府則是南韓文在寅（Moon Jae-in）新政府與伊朗發展的另一大挑戰。川普嚴厲批評歐巴馬政府與伊朗及聯合國達成的核子協議「軟弱無效」，伊朗沒有因為這些協議感謝美國，膽子反而更大。當時任白宮國家安全顧問佛林（Michael Flynn）在上任後首度公開面對記者，就指出伊朗試射飛彈的行為是挑釁，對國際社會來說，伊朗明顯的是在破壞整個中東地區穩定。他還譴責伊朗威脅美國及盟友的船隻穿越紅海，並批判「歐巴馬政府未能對德黑蘭的惡意行動作出充分回應，而川普政府要譴責伊朗的行動，是破壞中東及域外安全、繁榮與穩定，置美國民眾於險境中。」³⁹此外，川普上任後即對伊朗祭出經濟制裁，把 12 家企業與 13 名個人列入黑名單，指控他們支持伊朗研發飛彈、扶持恐怖主義，凍結他們在美國的資產，禁止和美國人交易。⁴⁰

而川普就任總統的首度出訪就選定中東，而且是去伊朗的死敵沙烏地阿拉伯與以色列兩國，這對剛被選出連任的伊朗總統羅哈尼（Hassan Rouhani）而言是項重大警訊。羅哈尼在伊朗是溫和派，2015 與六大國達成協議，以放棄核武換取西方國家撤銷制裁法案。羅哈尼的對手，56 歲的強硬派教士萊希（Ebrahim Raisi）則強調為國內窮人發聲，對於西方國家的手段則採取強硬的處

³⁹ 「警告伊朗 川普國安顧問不忘罵歐巴馬」，*中央社*，2017 年 2 月 2 日，<http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201702020011-1.aspx>

⁴⁰ 「伊朗試射飛彈 川普政府祭新經濟制裁」，*公共電視*，2017 年 2 月 4 日，<http://news.pts.org.tw/article/348559>

理態度。⁴¹川普在利雅德舉行的阿拉伯—伊斯蘭—美國高峰會上發表演說，呼籲所有國家聯手「孤立」伊朗，指控伊朗「煽風點火助長教派衝突與恐怖」。他說：「在伊朗政權願意成為和平夥伴前，所有良知國家都應共同努力，孤立伊朗。」川普還指控在伊朗支持下，敘利亞總統阿塞德犯下「難以形容的罪行」。⁴²可見，文在寅政府與伊朗的政經互動有可能會受到美國的制約。

⁴¹ 「伊朗總統選舉 羅哈尼贏得連任」，*自由時報*，2017年5月20日，<http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/2073819>

⁴² 「川普籲國際 聯手孤立伊朗」，*聯合報*，2017年5月22日，https://udn.com/news/story/11153/2477105?from=udn_ch2cate7225sub11153_pulldownmenu

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